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The world milieu 1s Increasingly beset by larger, more sophisticated, 
and more dangerous nuclear weapon arsenals. While Ameri­
can plans to modernize the land-based missile forces and NATO plans to 
modernize Its long-range theater nuclear forces have received extensive do­
mestic debate and Inquiry, significantly less Internal discussion has been 
generated over the modernization of the sea-based components of the Ameri­
can, British, and French nuclear forces.
Moreover, literature assessing the Impact of the M-X and the new 
long-range NATO missiles on stability and the balance of power 1n the 
European theater, U.S.-Soviet .relations, and prospects for future arms 
control 1s voluminous. A seemingly smaller body of current deterrence 
analysis surveys the possible Implications of the proposed sea-based wea­
pon systems. Furthermore, public scrutiny has been scant. Similarly, pro­
fessional attention has at least been momentally diverted to more politically 
volatile weapon systems such as the MX.
This paper 1s written In the hope of compensating for this neglect by 
providing a broad overview of the current plans to modernize the sea- 
launched ballistic missile forces if the United States, Great Britain and 
France. Given the enormity of the resources Involved and the strategic 
ramifications that will probably ensue from these systems, prudent consid­
eration of their underlying national security rationale 1s of primary Im­
portance. It Is the belief of this author that 1f the citizens of a repre­
sentative democracy are to be expected to sacrifice vast sums of govern­
ment expenditures 1n order that additional nuclear forces can be procured.
2the same citizens should he able to observe a measureable Increase 1n the 
security of their nation. If an enhancement of security does not seem 
likely or even plausible from substantial Increments to the West's stra­
tegic nuclear forces, other avenues for security enhancement such as arms 
control and mutual force reduction should be pursued with greater commit­
ment and vigor, with more creativity, and without the presumption that suc­
cessful negotiations over weapon systems entail a "zero sum" game strate- 
gem.
If 1t seems apparent In the final analysis that the Western powers
are not following the most optimal procurement strategy, respective 
of their goals and security requirements, what in turn does this reveal 
about the decision-making andgsal selection process behind weapons acquisi­
tion? Such questions are more than pertinent as world expenditures on 
arms and particularly on nuclear weapon systems are expected to rise annual­
ly without abatement during the 1980's.
3THE TRIDENT MISSILE SYSTEM AND U.S. NUCLEAR MODERNIZATION
The Trident submarine and missile system together compose a major por­
tion of the proposed modernization of the U.S. strategic nuclear triad. If 
the Reagan administration succeeds 1n Implementing Its entire "rearmament" 
package, the other two legs of the American triad will also undergo exten­
sive modernization. One hundred M-X ICBMs each with ten MIRVed and highly 
accurate warheads will be added to the already formidable Mlnutemen force. 
Further, the air-launched component of the triad will receive one hundred 
B-1B strategic bombers and the credibility of the B-52 force will be sig­
nificantly Improved with the deployment of over 3000 air-launched cruise 
missiles on these bombers.
The modernization of the sea-based component of the triad will most 
likely consist of at least thirteen Trident submarines Initially equipped 
with Trident (I(C4) missiles and later to be retrofitted with more accu­
rate Trident 11(05) missiles. Additionally, significant advances in Ameri­
can anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities, perhaps most exemplified by 
the procurement of the Los Angeles class SSN (nuclear powered attack sub­
marines), form an Integral part of the modernization of our sea-based 
forces.
Research and development on the Trident system began 1n the early 
1970s, Trident was specifically designed to replace the Polaris system 
which by the middle 1980s would be approaching the end of Its operational 
life. From Its very Inception, the Trident system, which would Incorporate 
costly state-of-the-art technology, generated Internal Defense Department 
controversy over the program's cost and extravagance. In fact, "The Trident 
submarine and missile Is, next to the MX, the most expensive weapon system
4ever conceived."^ Many analysts contended that the system contained 
"a serious Imbalance between the technical characteristics of the weapon
system and the comprehensive military requirements. In size, speed, and
2
cost, the Trident exceeds objectively defendable standards."
The eventual choice of a large and sophisticated boat was largely 
the result of Internal Navy politics, with Admiral Rlckover prevailing 
with a design for a large boat that would allow advanced nuclear reactor 
technology developed under h1s auspices to be employed." While the more 
extreme variants were eliminated by the Navy at Deputy Secretary of De­
fense David Packard's Insistence, Packard nonetheless succeeded 1n defer­
ring "new submarine construction until "the early 1980s," and to put the 
Trident I missile on existing boats, an option, long 1n development. . . ,
4
that had been opposed by the Navy."
Despite Packard's apparent success at curbing the Navy's profligacy,
. . .  The Navy demanded that the accelerated rate of 
development of the Trident submarine, adopted as a 
"bargaining chip" during SALT negotiations, be sus­
tained 1n exchange for Its support of the SALT Treaty.
Moreover, the President sought to use the Trident as 
a future bargaining chip with the Soviets and a means 
of placating domestic critics of the treaty. In the 
end, the Navy's version of the boat was approved. The 
existence of a realistic option and the support of 
some ant1-R1ckover factions within the Navy had failed 
to create the conditions for a successful move toward 
lower-mix weapons. 5
Before the Introduction of the first Trident submarine Into the naval 
nuclear force structure 1n 1981, the U.S. SLBM force consisted of ten Po­
laris submarines equipped with 16 missiles carrying three relatively large 
MRV warheads, and 31 Poseidon submarines, each equipped with 16 MIRVed mis­
siles carrying an average of ten relatively small (ten klloton) warheads.
5Hence, subsequent to the SALT II negotiations, the U.S. SLBM force con­
sisted of 656 missile launchers with over 5400 warheads. Extensive MIRVIng 
throughout the submarine fleet had enabled the United States to deploy over 
twice ss many warheads on this platform as were deployed 1n the American 
ICBM force. Moreover, the number of American sea-based warheads was approx­
imately equivalent to the total number of Soviet strategic warheads of all 
types.
The Polaris A-3 and Poseidon 3-C missiles, from their Initial deploy­
ment, have clearly remained retaliatory weapons with only countervalue cap­
abilities. The Polaris missiles have a range of 2500 nautical miles and 
the warheads have a circular error probably (CEP) of approximately 3000 
feet. The Poseidon missiles which have the same range, contain warheads of
7
greater destructive capability given a CEP of 1800 feet. The Trident I 
(C4) missile with eight MIRVed warheads 1s subject to nearly the same capa­
bility limitations because of Its CEP of 1500 feet, only for the reason 
that the technology necessary to give American SLBMs a counterforce ability 
has not yet reached the procurement stage. However, the Increased range 
of the Trident 1— 4000 nautical miles— provides for a great deal more oper­
ational flexibility, as this range will provide a major portion of the U.S. 
SLBM force with the capability of striking Soviet targets while situated 1n
O
American territorial waters. Twelve Poseidon submarines are scheduled to 
be retrofitted with the Trident I during the early and mid-1980s. Trident 
submarines constructed before the procurement of the Trident II 05 missile 
will also be equipped with the Trident I.
6The Soviet Sea-based Force Configuration
Any cogent discussion of American sea-based nuclear capabilities 
must necessarily Include a discussion of the commensurate Soviet capabili­
ties. Although the Soviet Union does deploy a strategic nuclear triad 
similar to the United States, the relative potencies of the three Soviet 
"legs" vary significantly, from those found 1n the U.S. nuclear force 
structure. In fact, great asymmetries continue to exist between the two 
force arrays. A delineation of the static force levels of the two adver­
saries, with their commensurate destructive capabilities, aptly demonstrates 
the predominance of the Strategic Rocket Forces 1n the Soviet force configu­
ration. The following levels existed at the time of the signing of the 
SALT II treaty9:




Strategic Bombers 50.5 10.6




Strategic Bombers 7.5 8.0
The Soviets have clearly emphasized the deployment of stationary ICBMs
7which are more reliable and accurate, yet Increasingly vulnerable to pre­
emptive attack. As a result of continued heavy Investment 1n ICBM devel­
opment, the most ominous components of the Russian ICBM force, "the SS-18 
and the SS-19 have, 1n the last two years, achieved accuracies (measured 
1n CEP) approaching the American Minuteman IIl--about 1200 feet."^
While this trend has caused many American strategic theorists to be 
concerned over the theoretical capability of these Soviet missllas to de­
stroy a high percentage of the American Minuteman force 1n a first-strike 
attack, one must be careful not to posit strategy from mere theoretical 
capability. Rather than a desire to achieve a credible first-strike po­
tentiality, 1t 1s more likely that the Soviet nuclear force configuration 
has resulted from the dominant role of the Strategic Rocket Force In mili­
tary budget allocations (e.g., the SRF has operational control over all land- 
based missile forces with ranges exceeding 1000 miles). Furthermore, Soviet 
submarines and SLBM technology and ASW technologies are estimated to he rela­
tively Inferior to their Western counterparts which seems to have precipi­
tated a Soviet resistance to rely on these systems to the same extent as the 
United States.
By early 1981, corresponding to the deployment of the first Trident 
submarine, the Soviet SLBM force consisted of 71 SSBNs with 955 missile 
launchers. The launchers were equipped with SS-N-5, SS-N-6, SS-N-8, and 
SS-N-18 missiles for a total of 1739 warheads (In comparison the tJ.S. total 
was 5344).^
The overwhelming American preponderance 1n sea-based warheads Is not 
destined to be of long duration. The Soviets are currently In the process
8of rapidly redressing the 3 to 1 American advantage. While Soviet MIRV 
technology has been already Incorporated extensively Into the ICBM forces, 
MIRVing of the SLBM forces has lagged considerably behind. Less sophisti­
cated MRV technology, which does not permit Independent targeting of the
missile's warheads, was used in the deployment of over 500 SS-N-6s, which
13
still comprise about half of the Soviet SLBM force.
But MIRV technology Is no longer the exclusive domain of the SRF.
By 1979 the Soviets had deployed eight new generation Delta Ill-class sub­
marines fitted with 16 SS-N-18 MIRVed missiles each containing one warhead 
or 3-7 MIRVed warheads.^ The SS-N-18 was the first Soviet MIRVed SLBM 
and 1t has been tested In three varieties thus providing a good deal of 
targeting flexibility: three warheads of 200 Kt each with a range of
6500 km; a single warhead of 450 Kt with a range of 8000 Km; and seven
15
warheads with much smaller yields with a range of 6500 Km.
At least nine more Delta Ill-class submarines have been deployed since
1979. A newer SLBM, known in the West as the Typhoon, will soon be deployed
carrying a larger number of warheads with accuracy Improvements over older
Soviet systems. Moreover, "With a production rate of some six SSBNs a year,
. . . [the Soviet] force. . . could consist almost entirely of Delta-class
16
and new Typhoon boats by 1985."
Indeed, Soviet SLBM capabilities are expanding quantitatively and 
qualitatively. For instance, the Increased range of the SS-N-18 missile en­
ables Delta III submarines to operate 1n the relatively safe waters of the
17
Barents Sea and the Sea of Okhotslo. But 1s the Soviet rate of progress 
as alarming as the Reagan administration would have us believe? A multi­
tude of factors, to be pondered later, deserve careful attention before
9the question can be answered.
Reagan Defense Budget Priorities and the Trident System
Reagan's proposed budget for fiscal year 1983 requested $3.8795 bil­
lion for further research, development, and procurement of the Trident 
system: $2.77 billion was requested for the 10th and 11th Trident subma­
rines, $742.8 million for the production of 72 Trident I missiles, and 
$366.7 million to continue development of the Trident II missile. This 
total compares with the $4.46 billion requested for MX development and the 
$6.3482 billion earmarked for strategic bomber modernization. Total ob- 
Hatlonal authority for the Department of Defense would rise to $257,469 
billion —  a "real" Increase of 13.1 percent and annual authorization was
l O
required for approximately $183,457 billion.
Although the Senate and House budget committees deleted about $3.2 
billion for Reagan's request, funds for the Trident system remained rela­
tively unscathed. Development of the Trident system, Including the expensive, 
highly accurate Trident II D5 missile (research and development costs alone
to exceed $8 billion) continues to be one of least controversial components
19
1n Congress of the administration's strategic modernization plan.
Communication systems to improveC3I linkages to SSBNs were also ap­
proved without detraction. A powerful underground radio antenna (called ELF) 
able to communiate with deeply submerged SSBNs was approved by both Congres­
sional panels as was the procurement of two Hercules transport plans which
20can communicate with submarines 1f they are close to the ocean's surface.
Ample funding was also approved for ASW platforms. Two SSNs of the
10
Los Angeles class ($1,027 billion) and the components to build three more
1n each of the following two years were requisitioned and approved. Both
Congressional panels also sanctioned the "continued production of the two
helicopters which are the principal ant1-sub weapons of all of the Navy's
21
surface warships . . . "
However, Reagan's defense budget Increases, at least Initially, for
FY 1982," almost all . . . went for conventional arms, not for the purchase
22
or speeding up of strategic weapons systems." In fact, the proposed
funding for the Trident system even decreased from that proposed 1n the
Carter FY 1982 budget ($2.8697 billion to $2.8096 billion.)23
As mentioned earlier, proposed Trident funding soared $1 billion for
FY 1983 largely because of the ordering of two more Trident submarines.
Funding for other strategic nuclear force platforms were of course the
"focus of considerable activity,. . . " as they were "down for $23.1 billion
24
1n the new budget."
The final budget approved by the House and Senate for FY 1983 further
reduced the defense bill's total authorizations from $180.3 billion to
$177.1 billion. The largest single reduction, $699 million, was from the
Trident submarine account thereby removing funding of one submarine. After
submitting the budget, the administration had decided to equip the 10th and
11th Trident submarine with the heavier and more-costly Trident II D5
missile (not scheduled for deployment until 1989), which would Increase
25
the cost of these boats.
The substantial reduction 1n Trident system funding for FY 1983 did not 
signal a Congressional softening of support for the program despite the
ndestabilizing factors the D5 missile may Introduce Into the strategic bal­
ance. Rather, "There appeared to be little support for the argument that 
the United States should not build weapons so fast and accurate that they
could threaten a surprise attack on Soviet command posts and missile launch- 
26
es." A motion from Thomas J. Downey, D-N.Y. to cancel further develop­
ment of the Trident II missile because of Its potentially destabilizing
?7
features, was resolutely defeated 89-312,' The locus of Downey's argu­
ment was the ramification of deploying a missile with potential land-target 
capabilities on a stealth-Hke platform such as the Trident submarine. He 
contended that because the Trident II could be,
. . . launched from submarines much nearer their targets 
than are U.S. land-based ICBMs, 1t could destroy them 1n 
only 6-8 minutes, compared to the 30 minutes 1t would 
take for a land-based missile to attack the same targets.
As a result, . . . „ the Russians would have to put 
their missiles "on the hairiest of hair triggers," for 
fear that 1f they were not launched at the first sign of 
a U.S. attack, they would be destroyed.
This would dangerously Increase the risk of acci­
dental nuclear war, . . . U.S. warning systems had given 
hundreds of false claims,. . . but "because we had the 
time afforded by the 30 minutes, . . .  we had the time 
to go to the computer and sort that out."
"Believe 1t or not. . . we do not want to rob the 
Soviet Union of warning time." 28
Downey's reasonable argumentation persuaded only a small minority of 
House members. Concerns over the United States appearing to se1f-1mpose uni­
lateral constraints on the qualitative development of Its strategic systems, 
without any assurance that the Soviet Union would follow a similar course, 
provided a foundation for Incredulity on the part of many.Hiuse members.- 
Overall, the Reagan administration has only sped up Trident II develop­
ment; 1t has not significantly sped up Trident I development. To some de­
12
gree, this has been an Indirect result of the level of energy the administra­
tion has had to expend 1n order to protect funds for MX development and pro­
curement. Additionally, funds which might otherwise have been channelled 
Into Trident development are being directed to the rejuventated Bl-B stra­
tegic bomber program, to additional funding for the MX missile, and to more 
substantial Increases 1n conventional arsenals.
The Trident System, American Strategic Doctrine and
Counterforce Targeting
The recent Reagan administration decision to accelerate the develop­
ment of the Trident II and the SSBNs to carry the larger missile, "though
30
expensive and probably premature," symbolizes a trend toward, and the codi­
fication of, an Increased counterforce-targeting emphasis 1n American nuclear 
strategy.
At present, the U.S. SLBM force. Including the Trident I missiles, does 
not have the requisite combination of warhead yield and accuracy for theo­
retical and hence, credible destructive potential against hardened military 
targets. As a consequence of SBLM targeting limitations and the greater U.S. 
reliance on submarine systems as strategic warhead platforms, U.S. land- 
based forces, currently-are theoretically more vulnerable to Soviet pre­
emptive attack than are Soviet land-based forces to a similar U.S. attack.
While a superficial analysis of static Indices of the strategic balance 
may label this situation a dire predicament, 1n reality this 1s not the case. 
To posit that the members of the Politburo would even consider such a calcu­
lated attack, given the distinct possibility of an American retaliation of
13
thousands of SLUM and strategic bomber warheads, 1s to posit 1n a rather 
tenuous fashion. And yet "self-1egerdamaln" over supposed vulnerability 
can paradoxically result 1n a hampering of American resolve 1n crisis situ­
ations. As Robert Jervis recently explained 1n International Security,
. . . U.S. commentators are creating self-deterrence 
because the scenarios they are contemplating probably 
are mythical. The best example 1s a Soviet attack on 
Mlnuteman silos and other U.S. strategic forces. Al­
though abstract American models may Indicate that these 
forces are vulnerable, these calculations Involve sever­
al simplifying assumptions— e.g,, that the Soviets could 
fire a carefully coordinated solvo ot hundreds of mis­
siles, that the figures for accuracies derived from fir­
ings over test ranges would hold true when the missiles 
were fired over different parts of the earth with dif­
ferent gravitational anomalies, that all systems will 
work as expected. . ., decision-makers should . . . also 
note the political questions which are begged. No de­
cision-maker has ever taken an action which accepted 
uncertainties as portentous as those which would be In­
volved 1n a first strike. Would the side that was be­
hind 1n the counterforce exchange continue to spare 
the other's cities? . . . would the leader be able to 
retain the necessary control over their emotions and 
their forces? 31
Soviet strategic deployment programs are 1n the process of reaching ma­
turity, while American programs are just In the process of receiving Increas­
ing momentum, after a decade of development which centered almost exclusively 
on qualitative Improvements. This has contributed a good deal to the forma­
tion of American perceptions of strategic vulnerability.
When American strategic programs begin to approach maturity In the early
1990s, the Soviet Union will likely face a formidable array of new American
strategic weapons (the MX, Trident II, Bl-B, ALCM, ami SLCM) all with counter-
32
force capabilities. If the current American situation seems precarious,
It appears to pale In comparison to the quandary the Soviets land-based forces
14
will face from these new American forces given the Soviet degree of 
reliance on land-based systems.
American strategic doctrine has already undergone change, 1n antici­
pation of the counterforce capabilities the Trident II missile and other 
new strategic weapons will possess. This should not be surprising given 
that strategic doctrine and national security policy are inextricably linked 
to the weapon systems that underlie their operational1ty.
However, an announced emphasis on counterforce targeting 1s not a 
new phenomenon In American strategic doctrine. American elites over the 
past twenty years have oscillated back and forth between announced counter­
force or countervalue targeting strategies, the Impetus of which has often 
been the climate of relations between the superpowers. For example, Robert
McNamara, 1n 1962, declared the counterforce strategy as the governing oper-
33
atlonal procedure for the use of strategic nuclear weapons. By 1964,
"this strategy had been quietly replaced by a strategy of retaliatory (sec-
34
ond) strike against Industrial and civilian population centers. . . "
During M s  second term, President Mxon returned official strategic
doctrine to counterforce which "culminated 1n the process of 'retargeting'
of the U.S. strategic forces from civilian to military objectives on the
Soviet Union (the "Schlesslnger doctrine") . . .  and yet three years ate
Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, declaring the Carter Administrations
adherence to the deterrence strategy stated that, "We recognize that oi r
second-strike deterrent Is to be stable as well a secure, the Soviet le -
36
terrent must be secure as well."
Presidential Directive (PD)-59, signed on Jt y ? IBO, President
15
Carter returned the U.S. to a counterforce strategy and was "reported as
37
directing a major change 1n U.S. strategy." This declared change 1n stra­
tegy has been continued, If not strengthened, by the Reagan administration.
But have U.S. targeting strategies really changed continually as a 
result of this political maneuvering? Desmond Ball poses the appropriate 
questions, "To what extent have successive U.S. strategic nuclear war plans 
1n fact emphasized the targeting of Soviet cities rather than military for­
ces and Installations? How familiar are officials 1n Washington with the 
details of targeting plans drawn up by the Joint Strategic Target Planning
OQ
Staff. . . ?" Fpr the purposes of this discussion, Ball makes the use­
ful distinction between American declaratory policy and force employment 
policy among other facets of U.S. strategic nuclear policy.
Declaratory policy 1s that policy "outlined 1n the secretary's Annual
leport and 1n other official pronouncements It provides some official 
rationale for budgetary and other decisions, and the currency for most of
the public debate about strategic policy, but 1t does not necessarily re­
semble at all closely how the United States would act 1n times of crisis or 
39
war." Force employment policy Is that policy which "describes how the
United States would actually use Its strategic forces 1n the event of a
40
nuclear exchange;" but,
The fact that senior Administration officials would still 
say 1n the 1970s that targeting plans should be revised 
to Include options 1n addition to "Indiscriminate mass 
lestrucilon of enemy civilians," 41 as President Nixon 
tated on he >u ’5, 1971 1s, however, a measure of 
1 ie extent to wmc. He realities of U.S. strategic force 
eriii lo ment policy hav. generally not been appreciated. 42
Perhaps what most ironic , bout his off and on "politicizing" of
16
American targeting plans Is that the underlying "American nuclear war plans
have always Included a wide range of types of targets —  military forces,
stockpiles, bases, and Installations; economic and Industrial centers;
political and administrative centers; and, after 1950, the Soviet nuclear 
43
forces." For example, 1n the 1960s, a variety of government pundits sta­
ted that the U.S. retaliatory capacity was aimed at cities, "But the Penta-
44
gon continued to target silos." In fact, when Richard Garwln, a physi­
cist, served on a White House advisory panel on targeting In 1968 with the 
"mutual assured destruction" doctrine at Its acme,
He discovered that "only 7 percent of the warheads were 
targeted against assured destruction targets [cities]."
He also said there was no evidence of previous awareness 
at the White House or on the National Security Council 
that the Pentagon had continued to target primarily mili­
tary facilities. 45
The response, under President Nixon, "was not to creat a new target 
11st, but.Instead to develop a better rationale for the existing one. ° The 
result was the "flexible response" strategy which Nixon and Secretary of De­
fense James Schlesslnger justified on the grounds that the Soviets, 1n time
of crisis, would contemplate a limited nuclear attack on U.S. military for- 
47
ces. Hence, the maintenance of deterrence would be better served 1f the 
President had this flexibility 1n targeting a retaliatory strike.
This.strategy regains with us to this day. It Is once again being em­
ployed, this time by the Reagan Administration, In concert with the "vul­
nerability" of the U.S. Mlnuteman force, to justify another yet more Inten­
sive and expensive round 1n the strategic arms competition. This strategic 
buildup, with Its none too subtle nuclear fighting overtones and consequent 
emphasis on counterforce capable nuclear weaponry, was Initially justified
17
by the Carter administration under the guise of a "new" strategic doctrine
dubbed the 'countervailing strategy1 by Secretary of Defense Harold Brown
48
1n a speech given at the Naval War College In August, 1980.
The strategy has been continued, 1f not in word then 1n action, by the
Reagan administration. Walter Slocombe, Deputy Undersecretary of Defense
for Policy Planning during President Carter's administration explains that
the countervailing strategy Is governed by
. . .  the proposition that deterrence over the full range 
of contingencies of concern requires 1n an age of strate­
gic parity that the United States have forces, and plans 
for their use, such that the Soviet Union, . . . would 
recognize that no plausible outcome of aggression would 
represent victory. . . In sort, the policy [dictates], . . 
that the United States must have countervailing strategic 
options such that at a variety of levels of exchange, ag­
gression would either be defeated or would result in unac­
ceptable costs . . .
. . .  the fundamental U.S. objective Is and remains de­
terrence —  but not just of massive attacks on U.S. cities.
The United States needs to consider also how to make U.S. 
nuclear power contribute to deterrence of less than all- 
out attacks. . . 49
Unfortunately, the nuclear force structure presumed necessary to Imple­
ment this capability, rusefully delineated 1n defensive terms, 1s the same 
nuclear force structure which panders to a first-strike capability. The 
perceptions received and the messages conveyed to Soviet leaders will be 
much more so derived from American capabilities rather than announced stra­
tegic weapons doctrine. As Henry Troflmenko has recently commented, " What 
are the guarantees for the opponent that the U.S. will show restraint, that
the American strike will be only retaliatory rather than preventive? Upon
50
what can the opposite side count?" But he concludes that,
The Pentagon strategists evidently realize that the 
Soviet Union evaluates the external threats to Its
18
security in categories of objective material potentials 
and possibilities, not pronouncements of this or that 
statesmen. So from the viewpoint of safeguarding the 
Interests of the USSR and protection of Its population 
1n case of aggressive use of American strategic forces, 
such declarations are Irrelevant. 51
Why should the announced "renewal" of a counterforce emphasis 1n tar­
geting be reason for worry If counterforce targeting has always been an In­
tegral and standard component of American nuclear war plans since the 1950s? 
First, the return to counterforce symbolizes the decline In U.S.-Soviet re­
lations especially 1n the last four years with Its resulting deleterous rami 
flcatlons for arms control negotiations.
Second, 1t reveals how very far U.S. and Soviet negotiators will have 
to come to reach another meaningful arms control agreement, given the pre­
sent administration's lackadaisical, if not blatantly disdainful, attitude 
toward the intrinsic value of arms control agreements 1n contributing to 
national security.
Third, 1t 1s being used as a justification, if not a mandate, for the 
procurement of a new group of extremely costly, sophisticated, and probably 
destabilizing strategic weapons perhaps most completely epitomized by the 
capabilities and cost of the Trident II system and the Reagan decision to 
accelerate the system's development.
As R. Jeffrey Smith contends 1n a recent article 1n Science, "Extensive 
conservatism and technological wizardry are behind the decision for a Tr1-
CO
dent II, and the strategic implications are unsettling." Furthermore, 
the Trident II program Itself will cost over $15 billion, and Its accuracy 
and potentially short flight time will make 1t arguably "the most destablll-
C O
zing first-strike weapon ever built, far more [so] than the MX,"3 as
19
Representative Thomas Downey (D.-N.Y.) has presciently asserted.
The most disturbing trend accompanying the "return1 to counterforce 
1s that qualitatively and quantitatively, the capabilities of nuclear wea­
pon arsenals, in general appear to be gradually permitting the likeli­
hood of a successful counterforce mission. Strategic weapon capabilities 
and strategic nuclear doctrine are approaching an unprecedented consisten­
cy and as a result, the possibility of a successful pre-emptive nuclear
strike looms more forebodingly. Offensive nuclear weapon technology is con­
tinuously Improving warhead accuracy and reliability, which allows for the 
use of a lower yield warhead (which 1n turn diminishes collateral damage 
should the warhead be used).
By making the use of nuclear weapons more believable through techno­
logical Improvements and doctrinal shifts to counterforce targeting the 
threshold at which the weapons might actually be used 1s consequently low­
ered (e.g., witness the Increasingly frequent discussions of limited nucle­
ar warfare 1n American defense circles). That can be the the only outcome 
of a national secrulty policy, which when adequately supported with wea­
pons of the requisite capability, attemots to make their limited deployment 
more credible r.nd theoretically legitimate 1n a conflict situation.
Hence, the real danger 1s that over time, given the current ineffectu­
al nature of arms control agreements, "each reversal [between countervalue 
and counterforce strategy] 1s effected at>a new and qualitatively more per­
fect level of arms on the purt of both the United States and Its "potential
enemy." As Henry Troflmenko further points out, "Therefore the counter-
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force of 1980 1s not Identical to McNamara's counterforce of 1960."
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Similarly, the counterforce of 1990 will not be equivalent to the counter­
force of 1980 as the arsenals and counterforce capabilities of both super­
powers continue to grow. If present trends are not arrested, the possibili­
ty of a successful pre-emptive counterforce attack will be more ominous, 
and Its attractiveness during a military confrontation may be too enticing 
to either side to restrain from dispensing with strategic deterrence.
Despite the fact that numerous uncertainties would still pervade any 
consideration of a pre-emptive nuclear strike even with a vast array of 
counterforce weapons, 1t 1s difficult to dispute the notion that counter­
force capabilities make nuclear pre-emptive somewhat more luring. These 
capabilities, whether real or surmised, exacerbate an already tension-ridden 
International environment by encouraging the superpowers to 1) deploy larger 
nuclear arsenals 1n the hope of securing a sufficiently redundant and hence, 
more "credible" capacity; 2) use their nuclear weapons first during con­
frontation for fear of losing them if the adversary Initiates a counter­
force attack; and 3) rely more extensively on "launch on warning" and other 
techniques designed to enhance pre-launch survivability. What culminates 
Is not only an Increase 1n the probability of Initiation of Intentional 
nuclear conflict, but also an Increase in the probability of a haphazard, 
accidental nuclear conflict occurring.
How will the complete deployment of the Trident. I and Trident II missile 
system affect the Soviet strategic calculus? Will they add to or detract 
from the maintenance of strategic deterrence? Although 1t 1s somewhat dif­
ficult to guage how deterrence operates at any level, much less the strate­
gic level, and what force levels and configurations enhance Its viability,
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1t 1s plausible to postulate that deterrence rests paradoxically on a 
mixture of factors, some contributing to deterrence because of their char­
acteristic "certainty", others contributing because of their characteristic 
"uncertainty".
The actual nuclear forces contribute to deterrence through the relative 
level of certainty they project with respect to such technical aspects of 
their composition as reliability, survivability, penetrability, and most 
Importantly, the level of destruction they will surely wreak 1f they are 
unleashed 1n retaliation. Additionally, how the opposing forces balance 
against one another and whether a rough parity (which beyond a certain level 
of forces can Include a wide range of seemingly "Imbalances" 1n static 
force levels ami yet still remain operable) exists appears to contribute 
to deterrence at the strategic level. Also, deterrence seems to be enhanced 
to the extent that each side has a theoretically survlvable retaliatory 
capacity should the adversary Initiate an attack.
The human element, Inclusive of the entire range of human limitations 
with respect to perceptions, emotions, sensible decision-making, resolve, 
and so on, provides the chief source of uncertainty 1n the strategic deter­
rence calculus. Ironically, the uncertainty these factors Introduce Into 
the strategic equation often enhance the workings of deterrence by encourag­
ing "self-deterrence" on the part of the government contemplating aggression 
through hesitant and conservative decision-making. And yet, the human ele­
ment 1s crucially important in sustaining deterrence. As Desmond Ball has 
noted,
deterrence 1s in the end e matter of national will and
resolve, not a function of residual military capablH-
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ties. . . National will and resolve are functions of 
many factors; the most significant are the character 
of a nation's leadership, the cohesiveness and his­
torical traditions of a society, the nature of the 
adversary; and a people's expectations and "percep­
tion of what 1s at stake." These factors cannot be 
quantified for Inclusion 1n any of the standard 
models for assessing the strategic balance and the 
viability of deterrence, . . .  56
With the predeeding thoughts as a guiding dictum, the significance of 
the exact technical capabilities of the Trident I and Trident II system ap­
pears to diminish substantially with respect to their Influence on deter­
rence. But capabilities do affect adversarial perceptions and thus, the 
selection of a weapons system can convey Intentions thereby stabilizing 
or destabilizing the International arena.
The Trident I, while a generational Improvement over the Poseidon-class, 
remains an Inherently countervalue weapon system although It 1s "capable of 
attacking a range of Soviet [soft] military targets, such as airfields, sub­
marines, ports, utilities, troop formations, armament plants, and some com- 
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mand links." However, 1t does not threaten hardened Soviet targets such 
as ICBM silos and C-3 links which would threaten the Soviet retaliatory 
capacity. It 1s, therefore, a weapon system that enhances strategic deter­
rence.
The deployment of the Trident II poses a more serious quagmire. For the 
first time, a nuclear weapon system will possess a very high degree of In­
vulnerability with a similar degree of destructive power and accuracy. From 
a purely "military tactic" perspective the Trident II 1s the strategic weapon 
par excellence. But this combination of capabilities does not seem to en­
hance deterrence because 1t does not appear to preserve the second strike
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nature of the SLBM.
Several options are open to the Soviets 1f arms control negotiations 
do not hold any promise. First, the Soviets might move to mobile ICBMs al­
though there are several operation problems connected with such a basing 
mode. Second, the Soviets might consider deploying an extended ant1- 
balllstlc defense system, but this would require renegotiation or abrogation 
of the ABM Treaty and a reliable system 1s still not technically feat4 le. 
Third, the Soviets may begin to allocate more resources to hasten the Soviet 
development of SLBMs with similar capabilities.
Fourth, the Soviets might pursue a launch-on-warning strategy "which 
would be the least expensive from their point of view and clearly the most
C O
worrisome to the United States." As a Soviet official recently confided 
to Roger W1lk1n, a senior fellow with the Joint Center for Political Studies 
1n Washington, while he was visiting the Soviet Union, "The more you have 1n 
counterforce capabilities, the more there 1s a danger that the other side 
will build up and go to a launch-on-warning, with the computer element 
stepped up and the human element reduced. And of course, that's more danger­
ous."®®
Whether the Soviet response 1s adverse and destabilizing will depend on 
how the Soviet leadership views the American modernization program. As ad­
mitted by the Reagan administration's arms control report, the response will 
depend on "whether the Soviets Interpret our overall strategic program an 
representing primarily an excalatlon of the threat to their strategic forces
or recognize the new program's clear emphasis [sic] on retaliatory capablH- 
fin
ty." As R. Jeffrey Smith contends 1n Science, "It seems clear that the
Soviets have chosen the former, and the consequences —  as yet unannounced -
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could be extremely dangerous."
U.S. and Soviet Antisubmarine-Warfare Capabilities
The stability of strategic deterrence depends on the mutual viability
and Invulnerabilityof the superpower's sea-based nuclear forces. However,
antisubmarine warfare (ASW) capabilities of the superpowers Increasingly
show signs of possibly encroaching on this Invulnerability. Because of the
enormous resources Involved, "only the superpowers can contemplate the
[strategic] ASW mission —  that 1s, the use of ASW systems to counter an
62
opponents sea-based nuclear deterrent forces,"
A delineation of the force levels derived from the Military Balance 
1980-81 reveals that: the United States had 41 SSBNs, 75 SSNs, and 6 diesel 
attack submarines for a total of 122} the Soviet Union had 71 SSBNs, 19 
diesel ballistic missile submarines, 49 SSNs, 148 diesel attack submarines, 
45 cruise-missile nuclear submarines (SSGNs), and 23 cru1se-m1ss11e diesel 
submarines for a total of 355; Great Britain had 4 SSBNs, 11 SSNs, and 16 
diesel attack submarines; and France had 5 SSBNs and 21 diesel attack sub­
marines.®^
Fortunately, "Neither superpower currently possesses a viable strate­
gic ASW capability but, . . . this could become a major concern by the end 
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of the 1980s." Technological developments already "on the horizon seem to
presage changes that may destabilize the sea-based deterrent by the end of 
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the decade." In addition, problems with diminishing the vulnerability of
25
of C3I systems, in order that a secure, retaliatory roll! of the SSBN 
forces can be maintained, will become more pressing as the counterforce 
targeting potential of both superpowers 1s augmented throughout the decade.
Moreover, these factors do play an enlarging role 1n the strategic 
balance because "these . . , developments create greater problems for the 
Soviet Union . . . given the more technologically advanced state of Amerl- 
can SSBN and ASW capabilities." Although both superpowers employ a 
variety of ASW platforms (air, surface, and sub-surface) the advantage 
lies squarely with the United States and NATO. For example, "In addition 
to the West's superiority 1n aircraft carriers along with Its other sur­
face vessels capable of ASW tasks, the American Los Angeles-class SSN Is 
the most effective attack submarine 1n the world and a total of 44 such 
vessels are projected for the fleet." Similarly, "the most effective 
Soviet ASW platform 1s the SSN (49 1n number) . . . [and while] . . .  the 
USSR continues to deploy 148 diesel attack submarines. . . these are not 
effective against SSBNs.
The effectiveness of the ASW mission 1s contingent upon an ability
to destroy the entire fleet of the opposition, given the nuclear weapons
capability of each and every SSBN. Hence, strategists should begin to
worry when the number of SSNs deployed and tracking an adversary's SSBNs
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surpass the number of an adversary's deployed SSBNs. The disparate de­
ployment rates of the two fleets are a salient consideration here. The 
at sea deployment rate of the Soviet SSBN fleet averages only 11 percent 
and even during periods of crisis 1n the past this rate has not be In­
creased. This compares unfavorably to an American deployment rate of
26
60 percent which 1s Increased tonearly 100 percent during periods of 
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crisis. Consequently, despite the fact that the Soviet fleet 1s 
larger, this Is offset by the higher American operational rate. This 
situation renders the American ASM mission a less difficult task than 
the Soviet ASW mission.
However, the continued American qualitative advantage has nurtured 
a Pentagon affinity for selecting lower mixes of highly sophisticated 
SSNS and SSBNs rather than higher mixes of less sophisticated weapons.
The Soviet forces, while less sophisticated and reliable, are more numerous. 
Should ASW capabilities of the superpowers Improve to the point where the 
ASW mission 1s conceivable and should the Soviets Increase their deployment 
rate, the smaller American might be subsequently less secure. The Ameri­
can SSBN fleet 1s also likely to shrink considerably during the 1990s as 
Trident procurement 1s expected to level off at 14 ships. 0
Nonetheless, the near future still appears more pessimistic from the 
Soviet perspective. As Robert Byers suggests, "There are a number of pos­
sible ASW countermeasures, such as the use of SSNs to accompany SSBNs or 
the operation of SSBNs 1n ASW-protected home waters [which will become In­
creasingly feasible given the range augmentations to new generation Ameri­
can and Soviet SLBMs], but by themselves these countermeasures are not suf­
ficient to ensure the continued Invulnerability of the SSBN— particularly 
1n the case of the Soviet Union.
Funding for ASW activities and development will continue to receive 
high priority, and 1f the next generation of SLBMs does Indeed possess 
counterforce capabilities, this win provide additional Impetus for a
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greater reallocation of resources to the area. For example in FY 1980 
alone, the United States committed $7 billion In funds to ASW jct1v1t1es, 
approximately 16 percent of the Navy budget. Furthermore, m ^W research 
and development accounted for over 20 percent of the Navy's entire R 8 
D budget.
Geographical factors also favor the United States and contribute to 
its strategic advantage 1n this area. While the Soviet Union has the 
world's largest coastline, its access to deep-sea basins is poor, and its 
few submarine ports are "poorly situated". U.S. submarine ports provide 
easy access to deep-sea basins and "the U.S. antisubmarine-warfare pro­
gram 1s designed to exploit. . . the strategic location of U.S. allies astride
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key geographical choke points".
’oel S. W1t agrees with Robert Byers that at least in the deep-oceans, 
"One conclusion. . . is cleat : Whereas American missile-carrying submarines 
at sea are generally thought to be invulnerable to . . . preemptive attack, 
Russian sea-based forces do not enjoy the same degree of perceived 1nvul-
7 A
nerablUty." In fact, he further concludes that U.S. and Allied ASW capa­
bilities are likely to cause a "particularly rapid" erosion of Russian In­
vulnerability 1n the deep ocean basins during the 1980s. It seems likely 
that Soviet leaders have perceived the strategic Implications of this situ­
ation, as revealed by the extended range of Delta boat SLBMs and the new 
Typhoon boat SLBMs. The extended range permits these boats to operate 1n 
relatively safe waters near the Soviet Union.
The significant American advantage 1n ASW technologies and the greater 
sophistication of American SSBNs help to belle the Reagan administration's 
Increasingly frequent rhetoric about the superiority of the Soviet strate-
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teglc forces. This advantage may even widen by the time the complete 
Los Angeles-class SSN and Trident SSBN fleets have been deployed. Par­
ticularly, the Tridents, and the submarines retrofitted with Trident mis­
siles, will have operational patrol area capabilities ten tidies as great 
as those of the Poseldon-class fleet. Moreover, although the Trident 
submarines are larger vessels, "they are . . . quieter and faster, can dive
more deeply, and have more advanced equipment for electronic countermeasures,
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should a chance of Soviet detection occur. Too often assessments of the 
strategic balance emphasized static offensive force levels to the exclusion 
of qualitative trends 1n weapon technologies. It 1s argued that qualita­
tive factors do not "project" political power as do actual arsenals of 
weapons but too often assessments of the strategic balance are designed 
for purely political reasons.
The crux of this situation 1s that "the U.S.S.R. does not have a 
similar capability and is not likely to develop one seen." Hence, as 
U.S. counterforce weapons are deployed 1n the later 1980s, U.S. ASM capa­
bilities will contribute to Soviet perceptions of a Impending American 
first-strike capability and "1t seems likely the U.S.S.R. will face a per­
ceived ICBM vulnerability problem that 1s much more vexing than the prob-
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lem now said to be facing the U.S."
Unrestrained Improvements In the ASW capabilities of the U.S. will, 
moreover, Influence arms control negotiations and the Soviet force confi­
guration. A major U.S. objective 1n past arms control discussions has been 
to construct agreements which encourage the reliance of the superpowers on 
highly secure retaliatory ofrces, (1.e. submarine forces) and to discourage
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the deployment of land-based forces which :hreaten those forces. Conse­
quently, the SALT I agreement sought to limit land-based systems while al­
lowing a mix of systems, but only 1n one d1rect1on--to sea-based systems. 
The SALT II accord placed stringent limitations on MIRVed ICBMs and the 
development of new ICBMs, while leaving sea-based systems relatively free 
of constraints with a freedom to mix sea-based missile totals upward, 1f 
desirable. ^
Understandably, the Soviets have been reluctant to alter their stra­
tegic force configurations, given internal political constraints Imposed 
by the Strategic Rocket Forces and the relative Inferiority of Soviet tech­
nology with respect to sea-based systems. Although, Soviet sea-based capa­
bilities have Increased rapidly, the SALT agreements have not produced a 
significant redistribution of Soviet strategic forces toward sea-based 
systems. The American superiority 1n ASW capabilities has almost certain­
ly reinforced Soviet aversions to relying more extensively on sea-based 
systems. It 1s doubtful that future arms control negotiations will be any 
more successful 1n accomplishing this goal 1f America's ASW capabilities
do not grant the Soviets sufficient confidence In the survivability and
79
reliability of their strategic submarine force. The current momentum 
of the American program makes this increasingly Implausible.
Lest we all lose heart over the dileirmas posed by these developments, 
the problems although numerous and complex, are not Insurmountable 1f pur­
poseful arms control negotiations are pursued. Several avenues which might 
be feasible politically for the superpowers and which would enhance the 
sea-based deterrent are: numerical restrictions on SSNs and SBBNs; re-
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strlctlons on the development of new SLBMs, 1n order that their counter-
value characteristics will not be upgraded; ant1 -satell1 te restrictions
to enhance confidence 1n C-I system?; and SSBN sanctuaries or 'ASW-free* 
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zones.
C,I Systems and Submarine Forces
The reliability and effectiveness of the sea-based deterrent 1s, 1n 
part, a direct function of the dependability of the command, control, com­
munications, and Intelligence (C,I) links which connect American and Soviet 
SSBNs to their respective political and military centers. If the retalia­
tory role of the sea-based deterrents 1 s to be credible, C3 Isystems must 
at least be theoretically capable of riding out a first-strike attack while 
remaining Intact. "Although the c^I systems of both superpowers have a con­
siderable degree of redundancy. . . , Cgl has been called the 'Achilles'
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heel1 of the SSBN," As Desmond Ball elaborates, "The principal reasons 
are, first, the clear trade-off between the survivability of the submarines 
and the ability of authoritative command channels to exercise precise, cen­
tralized control over them; and, second, the Inherent vulnerability of
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communications systems themselves."
At present, submarine system c~ 1 1s conducted through a diverse array 
of land-based transmitting towers, surface ships, space satellites, and air­
borne systems which cover a frequentcy range from extra-low frequency (ELF) 
to ultra-high frequency (UHF). A wide range of C,I platforms are necessary 
such that redundancy 1 s assured, and the deficiencies of certain platforms 
are compensated for by the strengths of other platforms. For example, ELF
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transmissions from land-based stations provide the most reliable ELF
means of communication to submarines and, "Only ELF transmissions allow the
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SSBN to dispense with the use of an antenna or a trailing buoy," -- obvi­
ously tactically beneficial. However, ELF transmitting towers are highly 
vulnerable to a first-strike attack.
The vulnerability of land-based towers 1s offset by the airborne sys­
tems, constantly on patrol over the oceans, which form the most survlvable
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vehicle of the Soviet and American c,I systems. But should an attack oc- 
cur, 1 t could take the planes "hours to get within transmitting range, . . . 
and they are vulnerable to the effects of an electromagnetic pulse (EMP)
gc
from atmospheric nuclear blasts over the oceans."
As with ASW capabilities, Soviet C-I systems are estimated to be less
8 6
sophisticated and survlvable than American c3I systems. Ideally, 1t 
would be advantageous 1f each superpower refrained from targeting SSBN 
C-I links (If some type of verification were also possible). Yet, this 
Is not politically feasible, and some of the C-I links that work to ensure 
the credibility of the sea-based deterrents, also work to ensure the oper- 
atlonallty and potential lethality of the ICBMs with counterforce capabili­
ties.
Enhanced credibility of C-I links can only help to stabilize strategic 
deterrence (assuming that SLBMs do not take on a counterforce potential).
The most promising course of action seems threefold: Increased redundancy 
1n the superpowers' C-I systems, thereby decreasing the theoretical possibility 
of a C-I disabling attack; Increased research and development to provide con­
tinuous Incremental improvements 1n C-I system platforms; and the pursuit of
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confidence-building measures over C^I systems, in context of arms control
negotiations (e.g., a prohibition of laser anti-satellite weapons develop­
ment).
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BRITISH NUCLEAR MODERNIZATION AND THE TRIDENT SYSTEM
As a medium-sized nuclear power, Great Britlan faces national securi­
ty problems fundamentally different from those experienced by the United 
States vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. While strategic deterrence rests on 
rough parity and the underlying operational concepts of "mutual assured 
destruction" and "flexible response", deterrence of hostilities 1 n the 
European theater relies on a more complex set of factors. Theater nuclear 
deterrence Involves two additional, Independent "decision-making centers", 
the tattered yet still viable American strategic nuclear "umbrella," a 
Soviet preponderance 1n theater-range ballistic missiles, a NATO edge 1n 
tactical nuclear weapons, a conventional force configuration which visibly 
favors the Soviet Union, and a rough, yet escalating balance at the stra­
tegic nuclear level.
For obvious economic reasons, Great Britain cannot procure the quantity 
of nuclear weapons and delivery systems requisite to the conferral of super­
power status 1n the International arena. Its security situation obliges 
Great Britain to accept a deterrence strategy based on countervalue target­
ing and minimum deterrence, and to rely on NATO and the American strategic 
nuclear guarantee.
Internal economic constraints, the technological sophistication of 
superpower nuclear weapon systems, and the lock of collaboration 1n Western 
Europe over the pooling of resources to develop "competitively credible" 
nuclear systems all work to limit the flexibility of British nuclear pro­
curement plans.
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Like the United States, Great Britain 1s undergoing modernization of 
nuclear forces. While the British modernization plans are not as strate­
gically unsettling as those planned by the U.S. defense establishment, they 
do represent a formidable strengthening of nuclear capabilities and could 
very well embitter relations with the Sov1et-bloc. Does the proposed 
British modernization of nuclear forces enhance deterrence 1n the European 
theater? What considerations were chiefly operative 1n the dedslon-maklng 
process that culminated 1n a proposal to purchase the Trident II missile 
system? What are the corresponding opportunity costs? These questions 
deserve attention 1 f we are to discern the potential benefits and costs of 
the British decision and whether 1t 1s the optimal path to pursue.
British Security Policy and the Nuclear Deterrent
Economic necessity, more so than purposeful design, has provided the 
chief Impetus behind the structural changes 1n British security Interests 
since World War II. British military commitments steadily receded during the 
1960s and 1970s as decolonization contracted the British Empire. Active 
British Influence 1n its defenses and security Interest is now generally
restricted to the European land-mass, Great Britain Itself, and the scattered
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colonial remnants, such as the Falkland Islands, of a once enormous expanse.
Great Britain has become what might be loosely called a 'medium power1, 
not a really analytically distinct description, but one which merely connotes 
a plane of military capabilities directly below that of the superpowers. 
British national security policy, however, still wears, to a certain degree,
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the accoutrements of a global power despite the fact that 1 t 1 s only "the
residue of a world power which continues to display many of the attitudes
and assumptions normally attributable to a major military power without
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the capability that such a status Implies." These trappings are perpetu­
ated by the British maintenance of an Independent nuclear force.
British national security policy becomes operational through two ave- 
nues--a conventional and theater nuclear force role In NATO, and Its modest, 
Independent nuclear force. This posture —  a combination of defense and 
deference strategies —  1 s viewed as the most effective means of protecting 
British Interests, given the economic and political variables constraining 
policy flexibility.
Exactly who the British deterrent 1s designated to deter 1s explicitly 
stated 1n British defense documents. The 1980 Defense White Paper plainly
asserts that "the gravest potential threat 1 s posed by the military forces
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of the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact states." The most precarious 
development of late has been the significant enlargement of Soviet theater 
nuclear capabilities through the deployment of the SS-20 IRBM and the Back­
fire bomber. This has prompted Great Britain to avidly support the NATO 
deployment of new long-range theater nuclear forces, consisting of the 
Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM), and to permit the 
emplacement of approximately one-fourth of the GLCMs on British soil.
The specter of growing Soviet capabilities targeted at Western Europe 
during a period of mutually acknowledged rough parity between the superpowers 
has instilled "doubts about the unequivocal commitment of the United States 
to guarantee Europe. . . " 9 0  These perceptions have reinforced British
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desires to remain 1n the nuclear club and to continue to give the nuclear 
component of the British force structure high priority.
The nuclear bias has persisted relatively unaltered since Its Incep­
tion by Churclll In the 1950s. rhe acquisition and maintenance of an in­
dependent nuclear force was largely justified on three grounds: the wea­
pons would preserve Britain's International prestige and great-power sta­
tus enabling 1t to more effectively Influence the United States; they 
would make a significant contribution to deterring the Soviet Union; and 
they would provide the opportunity for independent nuclear retaliation should 
the need arise. Exactly what conditions would create such a need were 
never explicitly espoused. 9 1
Finding a reliable and survlvable delivery vehicle proved to be a
difficult task given the "pressure from both the Royal Navy and RAF to
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keep the deterrent in the hands of the airmen," as vulnerable as these 
systems were. But the problem was overcome when the United States offered 
Britain the Polaris submarine system, excluding the warheads, 1n 1962 at 
a reasonable cost. The total procurement cost of the system Including the 
"Chevallne" warhead Improvements 1n the 1970s will come to 2.7 billion 
(1980) Index), almost half of the cost of the new Trident system. The 
force of four Polaris SSBNs has been Britain's nuclear deterrent since the 
late 1960s and will continue until It 1s replaced by the Trident system 1n
Q-l
the early 1990s.
The Selection of the Trident System 
While the Labor Administration mulled over its reservations about re-
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placing the Polaris system, the program to lengthen the operational life
04
and credible effectiveness of the Polaris missile was begun 1n 1973.
Deemed "Chevallne," the program was a specific response to British percep­
tions that Soviet Improvements 1 n ABM defenses around Moscow, permitted un­
der SALT I, were beginning to erode the penetrability of the Polaris m1s- 
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s1le. Heavy Soviet Investment 1n ABM research promised to bring about
continuous Incremental Improvements 1n the Galosh system capabilities.
For example, British sources have claimed that a new Soviet missile "can
'loiter' 1n the face of an 1CBM attack [or for that matter, an SLBM attack],
1 n effect slowing down and pre-starting Its maneuverable warhead stage near
the apogee of the trajectory while actual enemy warheads are discriminated 
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from decoys."
But why 1s It necessary to have the assured capability of devastating 
Moscow 1n a retaliatory attack, 1f numerous other unprotected and counter- 
value targets can be credibly threatened? The underlying assumption of the 
British strategy is that for minimum deterrence to be theoretically operative, 
Great Britain must be able to Impose unacceptable costs on the Soviet Union 
compared to the potential gains should the Soviets launch a preemptive at­
tack. The targeting of countervalue positions —  cities and Industry —  1s 
presumed to bestow the ability to Inflict this unacceptable damace. As 
Moscow 1s the economic and political hub of the Soviet Union, the capability 
to reliably strike Moscow 1s believed to carry with 1t the greatest assurance 
that minimum deterrence will be maintained. As Robert Hutchinson has pointed 
out 1n International Defense Review, "successive UK governments could not al­
low their choice of Polaris missile targets to be narrowed down by the ex-
38
elusion of the zone protected by the ABM system —  a sanctuary stretching
for hundreds of miles around the Soviet capital. This, . . . , did not
mean that Moscow [sic] was necessarily a British target; neither did 1t
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mean 1 t was the sole target."
The Improvements made under the Chevallne program allow the payload 
of the missile to change Its course, angle of re-entry, and speed of 
descent. Although Chevallne does not provide a MIRV capability the pro­
gram does provide for the early separation of warheads (a more accurate 
MRV capability), the Inclusion of decoys, and the hardening of the re-entry
QQ
vehicles to protect them from antiballIstlc missile attack.
With the election of the Conservative Government 1n May 1979, the 
question was no longer whether or not a replacement should be acquired, but 
rather what system would be most appropriate. Numerous options were avail­
able. Politically, three routes could be pursued: a direct purchase from
the United States; co-development of a system within Europe; or the develop-
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ment of the system by Britain alone. A multitude of launch platforms were 
also considered.
On July 15, 1980, the Secretary of State for Defense announced to the 
British Parliament that the Polaris system would be replaced with the nu­
clear-powered Trident 1 missile system. Great Britain would purchase four 
submarines at an estimated cost of 5 billion, with an option for a fifth 
boat which would add another 600 million 1f funding permitted. The expen­
ditures would be spread over the years 1980 to 1995 with more than half 
likely to fall 1n the 1980s. The program's procurement costs would not 
absorb more than three percent of the total British defense budget during
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this period and equipment costs would remain below five percent of that 
component of the budget. ®
Approximately 70 percent of the Initial outlays would be spent 1n 
Great Britain, with the actual construction of the boats making up the 
largest part of the domestic expenditures. The warheads, as with the 
Polaris system, would be assembled In Great Britain by the Atomic Weapons 
Research Establishment. Approximately 100 Trident I missiles would be pur­
chased from the United States Involving an expenditure of 1.5 billion.
The Government decision was accompanied by a document explaining the 
ratlunale behind the selection of the Trident system. Many military con­
siderations were Involved 1 n deciding which launch platform and delivery 
vehicle would have the greatest degree of survivability and reliability. 
Concerning launch platforms, problems with ensuring Invulnerability from a 
preemptive attack ruled out any type of ground-based force or air-launched 
force (although 1 t 1 s not apparent 1 f mobile ground-based forces were seri­
ously considered). Surface ships were ruled out because they are easier to 
track than submarines and they are not much cheaper. Similarly, diesel 
submarines are more vulnerable than nuclear-powered submarines because 
they would have to surface to recharge their batteries. Finally, a 'mini-
sub' option was considered but this would have required extensive develop-
1 0 2
ment by the British alone.
A variety of delivery vehicles was also evaluated. Ballistic missile 
forces were preferred over cruise missiles because they are much less ex­
pensive "for a given weight of strike power and a given probability of
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delivering 1t successfully, 1n the face of upgraded Soviet air defenses. 
Deploying existing Chevallne missiles 1n new boats (the actual missiles do 
not age to the degree of the outer shells of the submarines) or developing
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a new version of the Polaris A3 were rejected on the basis of cost and 
reliability. 1 0 4
Additionally, the U.S. Poseidon and U.S. Trident II systems were 
evaluated. The Poseidon system would not significantly Increase the 
patrol area of the British submarine force (which would have growing Impli­
cations given the gains to be achieved by the Soviets 1n ASW capabilities) 
and the number of warheads would be reduced. The purchase of the Trident
II would depend on a U.S. Government decision to be made 1n two or more
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years —  an unacceptable contingency to the British government.
Lastly, some consideration was given to the possibility of the develop­
ment of a collaborative program from the joint efforts of France and Great 
Britain. This, too, was rejected because of the economic costs Involved 
and the political constraints Imposed on Great Britain, as far as sharing
nuclear Information which had been transferred because of the "Anglo-
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American special relationship."
As 1s readily evident, cost, reliability, and Invulnerability were 
the chief criteria used during the decision-making process. Implicit 1n 
this process was the underlying fact that commonality with the United States 
would decrease total costs while maximizing the reliability of the British 
nuclear deterrent. After all, "Trident was . . . chosen, . . . because 
1t was the most modern, proven American system available. " 1 0 '7
From a military perspective, and given the expressed political and 
security goal of maintaining a viable and Independent nuclear force, the 
selection of the Trident system seems a prudent course of action. In all
probability, the Trident system will remain a highly Invulnerable, reliable,
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and credible system for at least two decades after Its deployment 1 n the 
early 1990s. But when other factors are taken into consideration, such as 
the detrimental effects that Trident's costs will likely have on conven­
tional equipment procurement and Britain's NATO commitments, Trident 1s at 
best a mixed blessing for British security policy.
Furthermore, financial commonality considerations have pushed Britain 
Into acquiring the D5 version of the Trident missile, a mlssle with capa­
bilities far 1n excess of those required for minimum deterrence. Ministry 
of Defense testimony before the House of Commons committee examining the 
Trident decision 1n 1981, revealed that choosing the D5 missile would re­
sult 1 n substantial cost escalations 1n ship design (longer launch tubes 1 
and a larger hull) and 1 n missile expense, and the allocations expended for 
long-lead Items for the C4 missile would be lost. .Although Initial out­
lays would rise If the 05 missile were chosen, 1 f 1 t were not
. . .  as the C4 was being phased 1n In the United Kingdom,
It would already be on Its way out 1n the United States 
(the boats at present fitted with the C4 will leave ser­
vice by 1997), with the loss of all the advantages of com­
monality and the sharing of support costs. If the [Brit­
ish] SSBN were not built to take extended tubes, then any 
m1d-term Improvement to a Trident I force almost certain­
ly would have to be undertaken by the United Kingdom , 
alone. . . The Chevallne project, . . . , shows how expen­
sive such a venture can be. 108
The cost of the Trident system has Indeed jumped. Four boats equipped
with the D5 missile will now cost at least A7.5 billion. The Increase of
50 percent 1 s due to "a £600 million Increment for the Improved submarines,
<390 million for the D5 missiles,< 710 million for exchange rate adjustments
1 0 Q
and 4L 800 million for Inflation."
The D6  missile does exceed Britain's deterrence requirements. As a
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consequence the government has attempted to downplay the hard-target capas 
blUtles and other destabilizing characteristics of the D5 missile, U.K, 
Secretary of State for Defence John Nott went so far as to state that,
"The government wishes to make 1t absolutely clear that the Increased ac­
curacy of the Trident D5 system played no part 1n Its decision to adopt the 
more modern system. " " 0  Further commenting on the first-strike capabili­
ties that the deployment of four Trident II submarines might confer to the 
British,Secretary Nott posited that,
Even 1f a United Kingdom government had any thoughts 
of a first-strike capability, simple arithmetic demon­
strates that 1t 1s totally beyond Its grasp. The fire­
power of the British force with maximum D5 payloads would 
be sufficient to target only a small proportion of the 
Soviet ICBM silos. Trident C4 would be sufficient for 
our deterrent needs. The reasons for choosing the D5 
hinge on the retention of commonality with the United 
States navy. Ill
As 1f to demonstrate Its own skepticism of Secretary Nott's argument, 
the government announced that the warhead capacity of the Trident II sub­
marines would not exceed the level that had been planned for the Trident I 
submarines. Whereas the C4 missile was designated to carry eight MIRVed war 
heads of 100 kt each, the D5 w»s designed to carry 16 MIRVed warheads but
will obviously carry fewer warheads 1 f every launch tube 1 s used 1 n the four 
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SSBNs. The "maximum D5 payloads" Secretary Nott spoke of would contain 
1024 highly accurate warheads, 2 number quite menacing to the Soviet Union.
The Opportunity Costs of the Trident Program
There can be no doubt that the Trident II system will revive the 
British nuclear deterrent, but British security policy 1s also strongly
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founded on providing Br1t1an with conventional defenses and to making a
significant contribution to the defense structure of NATO. It 1s all too
clear that planned allocations for the Trident system will have harmful
repercussions on other British procurement plans, budgeted to sustain
these other commitments of strategic magnitude. Selection of the Trident
II will 1n the short run complicate these matters. So Lawrence Freedman
has contended, "the real problem for Trident 1s not so much Its absolute
cost but the fact that a place has to be found for 1 t 1 n an extremely tight
defense budget," and, "Trident 1s arriving on the scene as an extra change
at a time when the mismatch between aspirations and resources In British
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defense planning has once again proved to be "Impossible to Ignore."
The benefits of Trident, therefore, must also be weighed against the 
opportunity costs of the program —  the sacrifices which will have to be 
made with regard to weapon requisitions, and the contributions these other 
weapons would make to Br1tains defense posture.
Upon Initially requesting the purchase of the Trident I program,
Prime Minister Thatcher assured President Carter that Britain was resolutely 
committed to the Long-Term Defense Program of NATO which consisted of 1) the 
modernization of the long-range theater nuclear forces, a portion of which 
would be 6 lted 1n Britain; and 2) annual real Increases of three percent In defense 
until 1991, In order that conventional capabilities would be strengthened.
The resources that the commonality with the United States would release 
would allow Britain "to reinforce Its efforts to upgrade Its conventional 
forces.
It 1 s likely, however, that this pledge will be gradually brushed aside, 
out of fiscal necessity. Moreover, "the Trident deal will probably hasten
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the time when Britain has to discard one of Its major conventional roles
1n NATO." ^  The beginning of peak expenditure on Trident (the late 1980s)
will correspond, unfortunately, to the move to annual real Increases of one
percent 1n the defense budget 1n 1986, which will "Intensify the problems
faced 1 n accommodating all current programs In the long-term costings when
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the time comes for them to be Included 1 n the actual defense estimate."
There 1s evidence that this 1s already occurring. The target of three 
percent was neither met In 1980-1981 nor 1n 1981-1982 and a new target of
2.5 percent has already been established. Some officials speculate that
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real growth 1n the defence budget may be as little as 1.5 1n 1982-1983.
The budget of 1980-1981 and 1981-1982 did not even contain substantial fund-
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1ng for the Trident system —  less than <100 million altogether. And 
further, "1 f past patterns hold defense spending will actually decline by
1.5 percent annually over the next decade, bringing 1t down to 4.4 percent 
of GOP by 1990."119
Budgetary realities will undoubtedly force the cancellation of numerous 
conventional weapon programs and, 1 n fact, this has already begun 1n antici­
pation of the diversion of funds to the Trident program. While the Initial 
government position claimed that Trident would not likely absorb more than 
five percent of the equipment budget In any one year between 1980 and 1995, 
military officials 1n the Ministry of Defence and the Royal Navy confirmed 
1n 1981 (even before the more expensive Trident II was selected) that 
"during the three-to-four-year peak spending period after 1986, thu new stra­
tegic nuclear deterrent could eat up about 1 2  percent of the new-equ1 pment
1 2 0
component of the U.K. defense budget. . ."
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According to Admiral M r  Raymond Lygo, chairman and chief executive
of British Aerospace Dynamics, speaking before the parliamentary defense
committee in 1981, several programs had already been cut since early 1980.
The cuts Included "an extensive redesign of "Sea Dart," the Alarm defense-
suppression weapon and, . . . [the] Sky Flash Mk2 ." Additionally, "The
production rate of Sea Skua and Sea Wolf has been cut and there is apparent-
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ly to be no mld-Hfe Improvement program for Sea Skua." Sir Raymond also 
expressed concern over the future of the Sea Eagle air-launched ant1-sh1p 
missile.
A review of future defense plans by the Ministry of Defense In early
1981 led to draconian budget cuts 1n the Royal Navy while the Trident program
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remained unscathed. But while these Initial budget cuts have generally 
detracted from the conventional forces solely designated for the defense of 
Great Britain Itself, British commitments to the NATO defense posture will 
also be affected 1n capabilities, 1f not 1n announced policy. The more 
grevlous adjustments to the British contribution to NATO required by Trident 
expenditures will take on a "structural" or "scalar" form. It 1s likely, 
for political expediency, that they will be scalar 1 n nature, resulting 1 n 
a relatively even diminishing of resource allocations across all NATO com­
mitments, while In name the commitments are sustained, rather than a structural 
change "substantially affecting (and perhaps eliminating) one of Britain's 
three major area, of conventional contribution to NATO . . . "  To com­
pletely eliminate or even significantly downgrade the extent of the British 
sea-based contribution (FASTLANT), the ground-based combat forces of the 
Central Front (BAOR), or Royal Air Force Germany are actions that would
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carry political costs too expensive to pay.
Ironically, 1t 1s possible that Trident development will even upset 
the previously planned deployment schedule of the weapon system most capa­
ble of protecting the Trident submarines from Soviet ASW capabilities —  
namely, the nuclear attack submarine (SSN). The House of Commons committee 
which from June of 1980 to early 1981 Investigated the Trident purchase
concluded that "Trident's most direct Impact will be on the construction
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of nuclear attack submarines." Only two ship construction yards In Bri­
tain, Vickers and Cammell Laird, are capable of constructing SSNs and 
Trident construction 1s already scheduled for the Vickers yard. The com­
mittee was told that although It would be desirable to maintain the present 
SSN construction rate of one every 15 to 16 months, Vickers could not build 
the SSBNs and SSNs simultaneously. If Cammell Laird 1s not made available 
through refurbishment for SSN construction, SSBN construction will displace 
SSN construction on a one-to-one basis for a seven year period. Whether or 
not the money would or even could be made available for refurbishing Cammell 
Laird and exactly what level of expenditures would be necessary was not made 
lucid by the Ministry of Defence. The Navy's Director, Project Team (Sub­
marines) did, however, tell the committee that "1 t would be uneconomical,
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with the level of programs we have, to try and run the two yards." As 
the committee concluded, given the continuous advances being made by the 
Soviets In ASW capabilities, curtailing SSN construction was a disturbing 
prospect.
Lastly, shortfalls 1n equipment procurements do not comprise the en­
tirety of the opportunity costs of the Trident program although they are
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most salient and visible. The failure to upgrade congentlonal forces and
budgetary cuts, especially 1n the Royal Navy, have worsened service morale.
The "nuclear versus conventional arms" competition for funds, moreover, 
has polarized the defense community, but not over whether a strategic de­
terrent should be maintained, but In selecting Trident II as the weapon 
system to accomplish the goal. The Inevitable result of these "defections
from the defense establishment" has been a lessening of support for Trident
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1 n defense circles and from the public.
Public opinion polls taken In September and November of 1980 and April 
of 1981 evince that support for Trident dwindled from 44 to 32 percent, 
while opposition to Trident climbed from 47 to 53 percent. Lawrence Freed­
man concludes that there has been, "a continuing decline 1n support for Tri­
dent that most likely reflects the fact that it has so few vocal supporters
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outside the Government, or even In the military." As the Implications 
of the Trident system become less obscure and more pronounced, public oppo­
sition to Trident, which has become more markedly noticeable 1n the last year, 
may necessitate a stronger enunciated rationale from the Government as well 
as more vocal support from prominent government officials.
The Rationale Behind the Maintenance of the British Deterrent
Despite the fact that British decision-makers have already opted for an 
Independent nuclear deterrent, 1 t 1 s useful to ponder whether the original 
justifications for the system still hold and whether the current rationale 
1s logically consistent with other tenets of British security policy.
As mentioned earlier, the original justification centered on maintaining
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Britain's International prestige and Influence with the United States,
contributing to Western deterrence, and providing Britain with the option
of Independent retaliation. Any such assessment Involves, of course, many
Imponderables, but 1 t 1 s useful nonetheless.
Perhaps the most "curious domestic and external political feature
of the British nuclear force 1s that the Incentives [since the Introduction
of the Polaris system] have been for the Government to play down both Its
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strategic and diplomatic significance." The modest Initial and operat­
ing costs of the Polaris system enabled the Government to carry on 1n this 
fashion until serious discussion over a successor for Polaris began 1n the 
mid-1970s.
The downplaying of the Independent deterrent since Its Introduction 
seems to belle the contention that the nuclear force was envisaged as aiding 
1n the upkeep of Britain's International prestige and Influence with the 
United States,since 1t has seldom really been evoked 1n such a manner. It 
may have been envisaged as such, given that when Polaris was purchased Its 
destructive potential represented a greater relative potency v1 s-a-v1 s the 
superpowers than 1 t does today, but 1 n any case the feasibility of this argu­
ment diminished continuously throughout the 1960s and 1970s as the super­
powers deployed much larger quantities of nuclear weapons. By 1980, the 
total number of British warheads represented only two percent of the U.S.
and USSR totals.^ Unlike the French, it does not appear that this justl-
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flcatlon has been all that Important to successive British governments.
As Bruce George and Karl P1erangost1n1 argue, "The British experience seems 
to support the view that while possession of these weapons may be a neces-
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cessary condition for great-power status, 1 t 1 s by no means a sufficient
condition, as Br1t1an has combined the possession of strategic nuclear
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weapons with a decline In Its International status.
The other two justifications can be dealt with together as the last 
1s really a particular aspect of the second. Although debate over how 
the British deterrent fits Into the strategic calculus of NATO and Great 
Britain Itself has 1n the past been circumscribed by domestic politics and 
diplomacy, these considerations are the mos+ germane to an analysis assess­
ing the necessity, or lack thereof, of an Independent nuclear force.
The difficulty has been 1n resolving the British deterrent with the 
American nuclear guarantee 1n context of NATO. Early on, British elites 
justified an Independent deterrent because the U.S. did not have sufficient 
bombs to cover all Important targets, and later, because Britain had to 
ensure that targets of low priority to the U.S. (1.e. medium-range forces) 
but high priority to Britain were Indeed targeted. The soundness of these 
arguments, however, was nullified by Increased U.S. nuclear weapon construe
tlon 1n the 1950s and 1960s and by the stationing of U.S. theater nuclear
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forces In Western Europe.
From the mid-1960s the justification has evolved Into a two-pronged 
argument which has remained relatively consistent given the wide doctrinal 
swings U.S. security policy has undergone. Officially, the British deter­
rent contributes to the NATO deterrence posture and also represents an 
Independent nuclear decision center to further bemuse the adversary. The 
contribution to NATO deterrence results from the British capability to 
employ their nuclear forces 1 n a coordinated retaliatory attack by the
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Alliance. The reality of multiple nuclear decision centers further deters
the adversary, a notion made compatible with the American nuclear umbrella
through the following ratiocination:
the British Government has complete confidence 
1n the U.S. guarantee but reconlzes that, mis­
takenly, the adversary may be less Impressed.
A second center of nuclear decision, particular­
ly one close to the likely conflict, would add 
extra uncertainty to the adversary's calculations.
The risk of calling the American bluff might be 
tolerable, but not necessarily that of calling 
the British and French bluffs as well. 135
On the surface this reasoning may please the "mental" palate, but 1t 
carries the baggage of several Inherent contradictions. Increasing uncer­
tainty 1n the Soviet contemplation of attack seems to be the 11nch-p1n. With 
the relative paucity of the British force 1n theater nuclear capabilities, 
British restraints or collaboration 1n a NATO retaliatory strike Involving
1 Og
U.S. strategic weapons would likely be negligible to the Soviets.
Hence, the magnitude of the British forces 1s not as crucial as 1s Increas­
ing the number of factors (and therefore the uncertainty or margin of error) 
which the Soviets would have to consider 1f they were contemplating a limited 
conventional attack of Western Europe. Despite official announcements to the 
contrary, the second dec1si on-making center permits the possibility of Bri­
tain Initiating the use of nuclear weapons against American wishes or the
opposite, remaining a sanctuary 1f a conflict between NATO and the Warsaw
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Pact had escalated to the nuclear level. Moreover, the British minimum 
deterrence posture seems to fly directly Into the fact of the American nucle­
ar guarantee, exposing British concerns over a possible "decoupling" should 
an American President decide against strategic retaliation 1n the event of
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Soviet aggression, or should the United States diminish Its commitment to 
Western Europe 1n the future.
The Inevitable consequences of these contradictions Is an Inconsistent 
security policy which "casts doubts on Alliance solidarity and the quality 
of Its declslon-making, and makes the assumption that an Increase 1 n un- 
certainty 1s always desirable." It Is simply presumed that more uncer­
tainty will foster a greater degree of caution, but this may or may not
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be so 1 n a crisis situation.
One might suppose that these pervasive contradictions and Inconsisten­
cies would unnerve American political elites anti strategists but this has 
not been the case for some time. Although limited nuclear capabilities 
were repudiated with contempt In the early 1960s by U.S. defense planners
such as Robert McNamara, acceptance of the forces grew gradually, and the
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U.S. position has moved to one favoring their retention.
What this leads to 1s the conclusion that the British deterrent 1s real­
ly not credible without the American nuclear guarantee given the first 
strike capabilities of the Soviet nuclear forces. Soviet commentary has 
alluded to this noting ;hat "any exchange between Britain and the USSR
would mean less than total destruction of the Soviet Union, but complete
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devastation of Britain." Without the U.S. pledge, British use of their 
nuclear forces would Indeed be suicidal.
One must really question then whether minimum deterrence, standing alone, 
Is a workable concept 1n the British context. It appears that the security 
of Britain 1s tied to NATO and the American nuclear guarantee Irrespective
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of the British nuclear forces. And yet, Great Britain plans to deploy 
a replacement for Polaris which will greatly Increase the potential destruc­
tive powers of the British deterrent. Four Trident boats will provide
a 166 percent 1 n number of warheads and a 23 Increase In gross megaton-
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nage. Such an acquisition will do little to mollify the tense state 
of affairs between the East and West.
The acquisition of Trident could also spell trouble for future arms 
control negotiations between the superpowers. In the past, the U.S. has 
held steadfast on refusing to allow British and French nuclear capabilities 
to be counted 1n the aggregate totals. It 1s doubtful that the Soviets 
will continue to remain tractable to this U.S. position given t!ie counter­
force potential of the Trident II system. In all likelihood, the Soviets 
will be Increasingly exigent In calling for allowances 1 n their own force 
configuration to offset new British and French systems, especially the 
British Trident II system.^
The British experience epitomizes trends 1n nuclear weapons acquisition 
that are also found with Increasing frequency 1n the United States and 
France. Larger arsenals of more sophisticated nuclear weapons are Increas­
ingly justified on the perceptions to be conveyed and what the other side 
possesses or 1 s "estimated" to possess, rather than on objective force 
requirements based on defesne and deterrence needs. It seems apparent that 
advances 1 n weapons technology are sought without abatement or doctrinal de­
sign, §nd that strategic doctrine 1 s continually "reinvented" to encapsulate 
the Improved capabilities, rather than the reverse. The British experience, 
1 n particular, demonstrates the effect that the Imponderable nature of the
o
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"tnue" functioning of deterrence can have on concerted efforts to sustain
deterrence. Lacking knowledge of how deterrence actually operates fosters
excessive conservatism 1 n the acquisition of nuclear weapons, and a tension-
ridden International environment only reinforces this proclivity. As
Lawrence Freedman contends, "The general confusion over what makes deterrence
'work' discourages dismissal of something that might possibly be acting as
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a constraint on the Kremlin."
In the end, what we perceive our adversary to be perceiving 1s, despite
the Inaccuracies Involved, given Inordinate weight 1 n the declslon-making
processes of weapon systems acquisitions. The "better to be safe than sorry"
principle begins to operate with little reflection about what capabilities
constitute an adequate defense and deterrence posture. This tendency
was subtlely revealed 1n a statement by preceding UK Defense Secretary,
Francy Pym 1n support of the Trident system:
Until genuine wide-reaching multi-lateral arms control 
can be negotiated, any diminution 1 n the pattern and 
structure of our wholly defensive capability must In­
crease rather than reduce the risk of war, especially 
at a time when the Soviet Union 1s rapidly building 
up Its massive military strength. 145
If the British have any confidence whatsoever 1n the American nuclear 
guarantee and 1n the continued viability of NATO, then the acquisition of 
the Trident II system appears to contribute little to the defense of Britain, 
Is of dubious strategic value and consumes resources which could be put to 
better use strengthening Britain's commitment to NATO and British conventional 
forces. The questions are what actually deters, what posture constitutes ade­
quacy, and what posture constitutes excessiveness? A separate nuclear de­
terrent seems beneficial to Britain, but the opportunity costs of Trident 
significantly subtract from the deterrent's value.
*
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MODERNIZATION OF THE FRENCH SEA-BASED NUCLEAR FORCES
Like the sea-based nuclear forces of Great Britain and the United 
States, the French sea-based nuclear forces are undergoing expansion and 
modernization. The problems facing France to some degree resemble the 
problems facing Great Britain. Obviously, this 1s due to France's status 
as a medium nuclear power and the level of resources available for defense 
spending that this status Implies. The similarity to the British situa­
tion really terminates at that juncture. Neither France nor Great Britain 
can compete with the superpowers 1 n the procurement of nuclear weapon sys­
tems. In order to justify the existence of their Independent nuclear deter­
rents, the medium nuclear powers must resort to arguments based on the 
tenets of proportional deterrence and proportionality. Theoretically, 
the Inferior power sustains deterrence by Insuring that the perceived costs 
of the aggression clearly exceed Its perceived benefits to the adversary.
The Inferior power cannot respond 1n kind to all levels of attack, but 1t 
must have the credible capability of a retaliatory response which over­
shadows the benefits from an attack.
Logical flaws also accompany this deterrence strategy for French defense 
planners and politicians, and 1 n some respects the flaws significantly pre­
clude a cohesslon and consistency 1 n Important areas oi French national 
security policy.
Economic problems also plague France and these problems will worsen In 
the future as the superpowers continuously redefine and raise the level of 
sophistication necessary In nuclear weapon systems to ensure a credible and 
reliable retaliatory force.
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Further, the French relationship with the United States 1s fundamental­
ly different from the relationship Great Britain enjoys. This has not been 
a development through happenstance, but one by design. The French have 
serious reservations about relying on the American nuclear guarantee al­
though 1t undoubtedly does enhance French security. Moreover, the French 
decided long ago that their sovereignty over defense policy formulation 
would not be subsumed Into the NATO Infrastructure. The result has been 
an Amrelcan reluctance to transfer nuclear weapon technology to Franch and an 
all too visible trend of a widening gap between the sophistication of French 
and superpower nuclear weapons systems.
The Modernization Plans Under Mltterand
The opinions held by socialist, President Mltterand, of the French 
nuclear forces have undergone a complete turnabout. Mltterand expressed 
opposition to the forces 1n the mid-1960s. He now overwhelmingly advocates 
not only the forces maintenance, but their modernization and enhancement as 
well,during this decade.
Indeed, Mltterand's current conservative views 1n this realm are a 
marked departure from views he has espoused In the past. Only two years ago, 
Mltterand was calling for the elimination of nuclear weapon stocks. But 
Mltterand's views gradually moved to the center as reflected 1n h1s tacit 
acceptance of the Idea of an Independent nuclear deterrent 1 n 1978, but even
at this time he did not advocate an expansion of France's nuclear potential.
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He Instead proposed that the forces remain at the levels existing In 1978. 
More recent statementsby Mltterand reveal h1s perceptions of the growing Im­
balance 1n theater nuclear forces 1n the European arena and h1s belief that
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remedial actions must be taken by France and NATO. For example, he has 
stated that, "the national nuclear deterrent strategy 1 s the only means 
of reducing the danger of war. It 1s necessary to continue the moderniza­
tion of our tactical and strategic forces giving priority to the naval corn-
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ponent In view of the more promising state of the art 1 n this field."
The evolution: of Mltterand's position since the mid-1960s to a tenacious 
support of the French strategic nuclear forces mirrors developments 1n the 
domestic political spectrum, and coincides with the relative heightening of 
tensions between the East and West. The end of the 1960s witnessed the 
demise of American strategic supremacy, but this was partially compensated 
for by the rapproachement between the superpowers. When the relative period 
of calm dissipated and Soviet modernization of theater nuclear forces ensued 
1n the late 1970s, strategic parity between the superpowers and the growing 
Imbalance 1n Europe made the American nuclear guarantee Increasingly suspect.
As a consequence of these strategic and theater developments, the French 
government has enunciated strong support for a redressing of the theater Im­
balance caused by the Soviet deployment of the SS-70 IRBM and the Backfire 
bombers. The plans of NATO to modernize Its long-range theater nuclear forces 
are viewed favorably.
For the most part Mltterand has re-aff1rmed a nuclear bias 1n defense al­
locations and has halted the erosion 1 n expenditures for strategic nuclear 
forces which began In the early d'Estalng years. The 1982 defense budget, 
adopted by the National Assembly In November, 1981 amounted to FFr 142,970 
million or almost $23 billion, a nominal Increase of 17.5 percent from the 
previous year. A hefty proportion of the funds allocated, nearly one third.
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were designated for modernization and research and development of the
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French nuclear forces. The budget provided funding for a seventh
SSBN, development of a new mobile land-based ballistic missile, and a
149
tactical nuclear missile.
The 1983 defense budget continued to emphasize nuclear programs which, accordlnj
to the French Cabinet, revealed "the priority given to development of
the submarine-based deterrent force." Although, nominally the budget
rose FFr 158,860, an Increase of ten percent, this was Insufficient to
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outpace Inflation.
A static delineation of the French strategic nuclear forces aptly demon­
strates that the French have tried to emulate the superpowers, at least on 
the surface, by deploying a strategic triad of nuclear forces on submarines, 
strategic aircraft, and land-based ballistic missiles.
The SLBM force currently rests on five SSBNs, the last of which, Le 
Tonnant, was commissioned In mld-1980. Each submarine 1s equipped with 
16 missiles with a range of 1850 nautical miles, and each missile carries 
one warhead of one megaton yield with penetration aids (to foil Soviet ABM 
capabilities) . 1 5 1 A sixth SSBN, L'lnflexlble, will be launched In 1985 and 
and.-will be anV'lnterygeneratlonal" type submarine between the Redoubtable
class currently deployed and a new generation SSBN being considered for de-
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ployment 1n the 1990s. Although of similar displacement, L'lnflexlble will 
take advantage of technological advances 1 n guidance, diving, detection, and 
noise reduction systems, Moreover, It will be equipped with a new missile, 
the M-4, which will also be retrofitted to the other five SSBNs (although 1t
Is not for certain whether the first SSBN commissioned will be retrofitted).
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The M-4 missile will Incorporate advances being made 1n French missile tech­
nology. At present, none of the French strategic forces are MRVed or MIRVed, 
The M-4, however, will be MRVed with probably six warheads of 150 klloton
yield. The M-4 will also have a range Improvement of 35 percent (to 2500 
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nautical miles).
Mltterand seems to be resolutely determined to Increase the quantity, as
well as quality of the French sea-based deterrent. The construction of a
seventh SSBN was announced In July 1981 and according to the Minister of
Defense, Charles Hernu, the number of SSBNs 1n the French Navy could Increase
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to eight by 1988. The communique from the President's offlch which an­
nounced the plans for the seventh SSBN stated that Mltterand ordered "a mini­
mum of three French nuclear submarines be constantly on patrol outside French
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waters. . . " Henru elaborated that France should actively encourage arms
negotiations between the superpowers while modernizing and Increasing Its
157
own nuclear forces.
The French silo-based missile force, the Force de Dissuasion on the Pla­
teau d'Albion, consists of 18 S.3 IRBMs which recently replaced the S.2 
missiles 1n the same silos (during 1980-1982). The S.3 IRBM represents a 
range Improvement of 150 nautical miles (from 1700 nm to 1850 nm) and a s1g- 
nlflcant warhead yield enlargement (from 150 let to 1 Mt). However, quali­
tative and quantitative Increases 1n Soviet theater nuclear forces make this 
leg of the triad highly susceptible to a Soviet first strike. Particularly 
the Soviet deployment of over 300 SS-20s, each, MIRVed with three highly ac­
curate (CEP of 250 meters) warheads of 150 klloton yield, seriously threatens 
the comparatively exiguous French force.
Perceptions of the vulnerability, of course, have not gone unnoticed by
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the French. Discussions concerning a feasible replacement and whether 1t
should be mobile or not have been going on longer than Mltterand has been
President. International Defense Review posits that two somewhat dissimilar
schemes are the leading candidates: the first envisages a deployment of
approximately 30 missiles, each with three warheads, Into hardened fixed
silos; the second, more complicated scheme would entail approximately 1 0 0
single-warhead missiles mounted on vehicles which would be transported around
France on Transall aircraft. Decoy missiles would also be flown (a kind of
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a1r-based "shell game") to make targeting more difficult. During a crisis 
situation, "On the first alert, the aircraft would fly to their assigned 
military bases and, on the second, the vehicles would move to the missile 
launch position. " ^ 0
Close examination exposes the potential problems of either plan. With 
continuous incremental Improvements 1n Soviet missile accuracies and the
relative ease of Increasing warhead yields, H  Is at least questionable whether 
a new land-based force of the size, even If very hardened, would significantly
Increase the Invulnerability of the leg of the French triad. The second op­
tion raises Issues of reliable command, control and communication not unlike 
the sea-based forces, and 1 t might not solve the Invulnerability connundrum v/.: 
either. Whether the expense 1s worthwhile for either mode, or fjr that mat­
ter any mode, 1s a difficult question to be faced alike by French military 
strategists and politicians. Furthermore, each plan unnecessarily places more 
military targets on French soil which does not seem wise should deterrence 
fall 1n the European theater.
Although the word "triad" has been used earlier to describe the conflgu-
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ration of the French strategic forces,the term will probably not be applic­
able to the French nuclear force structure beyond 1985. The a1r-based com­
ponent of the French strategic forces consists of 37 Mirage IV A strategic 
bombers supported by eleven KC 135 m1d-fl1ght tankers which afford the 
Mirage IV As their strategic character. This provides the bombers an at­
tack radius of 1735 nautical miles and each carries a single AN-22 gravity 
bomb of 60 klloton yield. The fleet 1s aging, obselescent, and there 
are grave doubts as to whether the planes could even penetrate Soviet air 
defenses. They too, like the French IRBMs, are highly vulnerable to a 
first strike attack. They are also very expensive to maintain and the 
force's credible lethality 1 s small especially 1 n comparison to the submarine 
force. In view of these realities, the French have already decided to phase
out by 1985 all but 15 of the Mirage IV As which will very likely be used
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for strategic reconnaissance and 1n tactical support modes. Despite
speculation that a force of Mirage 4000s equipped with new ASMP (A1r-Sol-
Moyenne Portee) tactical nuclear stand-off missiles may secure French an air-
based strategic force after 1985, "the continuing absence of a decision to
procure a new strategic bomber cast[s] some doubt on the future of this leg
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of the French deterrent." If realistic strategic planning plays a determlna 
t1ve role 1 n deciding whether the a1 r-based component of the strategic triad 
should be relinquished to more cost-effective and militarily effective equip­
ment procurement, then 1n all likelihood the French strategic force configu­
ration will contract Into a strategic "d1ad" after 1985.
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French National Security Policy and the Force de Dissuasion
The French, to a somewhat greater degree than the British, value the 
maintenance of their Independent nuclear deterrent. The French credit more 
than national security value to their nuclear deterrent. As Lawrtnce Freed­
man has maintained 1n a recent analysis of the British nuclear deterrent:
In France, a mystique has developed around the Independent 
deterrent, 1n that 1t has become associated with some deep 
sense of national destiny. No politicians, even communists, 
dare question Its value. In Britain, by contrast, little 
patriotic symbolism has been generated around the nuclear 
force, and few outrageous claims have been made as to Its 
military value. 164
Consequently, whether or not an Independent French nuclear force of 
strategic capability should be maintained Is not, In the French domestic 
political arena, a moot question at this time. So Edward Kolodzlej explains 
1n "French Security Policy: Decisions and Dilemmas,"
Even before the Socialist victory, there was broad 
agreement across the French political spectrum that the 
force de dlssauslon should be the centerpiece of French 
military planning, . . . that France should retain and even 
Increase the capability of Its nuclear strike force, and 
that the force should essentially be a countervalue system.
All concurred, moreover, that French nuclear forces should 
remain under tight national control. 165
As a medium nuclear power, French deterrence strategy cannot operate on 
an equivalent basis with the Soviets. Like Great Britain, France must be 
content with a minimum or proportional deterrence posture due prlnclply to 
the Imposition of technological and economic constraints. As such, the sus­
tenance of deterrence, 1n this context, 1s crucially dependent on the ability 
of the French to present a credible and reliable capability to respond In 
retaliation, should the adversary contemplate aggression against France's
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vital Interests. The potential for retaliation must be carefully tailored 
to convey to the adversary that the punltlon of aggression would clearly 
exceed the benefit expected from 1t. Hence, with Its modicum of missiles 
France must target what 1t presumes the Soviets to value most— civilian 
population and Industrial centers. Even 1f the French warheads were highly 
accurate and possessed lethal capabilities against hardened military targets, 
the optimal strategy would still consist of countervalue targeting.
The credible posture under proportional deterrence, however, 1s also 
contingent upon a resolute and staunch leadership, which Is perceived to 
be able to make the decision to actualize the threat should deterrence fall. 
The possibility that forces may be employed 1s at least as crucial as the 
objective capability to perform the retaliation. This Is of particular Im­
portance and relevance to the French position. First, because 1t 1s a med­
ium-nuclear power, France's deterrence posture, more so than the posture of 
the United States v1s-a-v1s the Soviet Union, requires to a greater degree,
"steadfast, political leadership. . . [able] . . .  to manipulate the essen-
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tlally psychological determinants of deterrence." As France's strategic 
nuclear force 1s much smaller than the Soviet's strategic nuclear force, 
French Intentions to respond to a preemptive attack must be more resolute 
and less obscure. France's lack of formal participation 1n NATO would make 
these pressures even more burdensome on the French leadership 1f a serious 
crisis threatened France's vital Interests.
Outside of the NATO Infrastructure, French declarations that Independent 
nuclear decision centers contribute to the enhancement of Western deterrence 
are more cogent and doctrlnally consistent (although probably not more credi­
ble) than similar declarations made by the British who explicitly confide 1n 
the American nuclear guarantee and whose security 1s formally tied to NATO.
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France's continued peripheral participation 1n NATO symbolizes Its hesi­
tancy about relying too extensively on the American nuclear umbrella. The 
French have no qualms about expressing their reservations concerning the 
protection of French vital Interests through the American strategic guaran­
tee. Indeed, therein lies the justification for the French Force Nuclear 
Strateglque. As David Yost explains,
French policy holds that only national nuclear forces can 
protect national Interests, and that France's security 1s 
ultimately dependent on France's ability to threaten the 
Soviet Union with unacceptable damage —  damage that would 
exceed 1n value whatever benefits the Soviets might seek 
1n conquering or destroying France. 167.
Moreover, although the views of General Mery, who held the post of 
French armed forces chief of staff, have been somewhat successful 1n enlarging 
the French notion of security Interests, "French announced and operational 
military strategy . . . [continues to emphasize]. . . France's Independence, 
freedom of maneuver 1n threatening or using Its military forces, and the
limits of credibility of the French nuclear deterrent beyond Its 1dent1f1ca-
168
t1on with the Inviolability of French territory." Mery had tried to pro­
mulgate the notion that French national security should be Intertwined with 
an enlarged sanctuary encompassing "not only French national territory but 
"Europe and Its Immediate approaches, Including 1n particular the Medlterrana*- 
nean basin.
One must conclude that at least announced French security policy 1s 
founded on and derives Its potency from the French strategic forces although 
1t will reluctantly admit the benefits of the American nuclear guarantee and 
the Inseparable destiny from France's European neighbors 1n NATO. This 1s 
much unlike the averred security policy of Great Britain which explicitly
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stresses the role of NATO and the American strategic nuclear guarantee 1n
providing for Great Britain's security to almost exclusion of the British
strategic nuclear forces. As Jean Klein has summarized recently,
Opting In favor of nuclear deterrence 1s a central element 
1n French military policy and nothing so far Indicates a 
change 1n this respect. . . the French government 1s con­
scious of the fact. . . that the threat of Its use [the 
nuclear weapon] 1s credible only for the defense of vital 
Interests. However, the latter are not Interpreted 1n a 
limited way. . . Moreover, the highest authorities have 
vowed that France's fate Is linked to Its neighbors' and 
that France would not remain Indifferent to an aggression 
aimed at them. Consequently, Europeans will benefit In­
directly from the existence of an additional nuclear de­
cision center on the continent 1f the SNF succeeds 1n 
casting a supplementary factor of uncertainty Into the 
strategic equation and does not appear just as a simple 
appendix of the American system. It 1s therefore crucial 
that France possesses adequate nuclaer means of Its own 
and that 1t preserves Its autonon\y In deciding on their 
use. 170
The Credibility of the French Strategic Nuclear Forces
The capabilities necessary to support declarative security policy can 
be significantly out of proportion to the capabilities actually possessed 
by a nation-state. Is this the case with France, especially given French 
affirmations of the unreliability of the American strategic nuclear guaran­
tee? Jeen Klein confidently asserts that "Today, France has at Its disposal 
a nuclear capability which allows 1t to practice with success a defense 
strategy of proportional deterrence and to Inflict on Its adversary losses 
completely unrelated to ".he coveted stakes. . . To Implement such a strate-
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gy, France possesses sufficient retaliatory power." Is this so?
The crux of the matter 1s whether France does Indeed possess a credible 
retaliatory capacity as Jean Klein contends. Numerous Inponderables pervade 
such a consideration. Perhaps the mo&t basic 1s the difficulty 1n estimating
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what level of forces 1s adequate to maintain deterrence, given that the 
very essence of deterrence (l.e., an unemployment of forces) precludes 
an accurate assessment of how opposing capabilities might Interact and 
offset one another In an actual conflict situation. Another considera­
tion which hampers the setting of appropriate force levels 1s exactly 
what 1s one trying to deter? What level of antagonism will be tolerated?
Does France only hope to deter actual conflict with the Soviet Union or 
does France desire to deter excessive Soviet political pressure and In­
fluence 1n Western Europe also? The more vague the manner 1n which vital 
Interests are proclaimed, the more difficult these questions are to answer.
The French nuclear forces are obviously designated to deter a direct 
assault, — whether conventional, nuclear, or both —  on French soil. But 
what the French Government means by "vital Interests" 1s neither clear nor 
necessarily constant over time and this equivocality 1s Intentional. Jean 
Klein explains the rationale behind this: "By maintaining a deliberate 
ambiguity 1n the definition of Its "vital Interests" and by reserving the 
right to act 1n the approaches to Its territory at an opportune time, , . . , 
the French Government presents the potential aggressor with an unknown fac­
tor which complicates Its strategic calculus and can make the potential ag-
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gressor give up h1s project."
For the purposes of this discussion, 1t Is sufficient to appraise the 
dlssauslve ability of the French strategic nuclear forces 1n deterring a 
Soviet first-strike. Ascending Soviet capabilities 1n theater nuclear forces 
and anti-submarine warfare deserve the most consideration becuase they di­
rectly threaten the French arsenal. As Paul Stares has defined the question:
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"Its capablty to deter a potential aggressor rests on there being a suf­
ficient proportion of the retaliatory forces available at all times, that 
can survive a preemptive attack, functions reliably, penetrate. . . Soviet 
defenses . . .  and still deliver as much damage as deemed to be "unaccepta­
ble" to the Warsaw Pact."^
A secure retaliatory capacity depends foremost on the survivability 
of the forces, presupposing that the forces can accomplish their task once 
launched. Survivability 1s also of crucial Importance 1n Influencing the 
adversary's perceptions of the credibility of the forces. It Involves the 
ability of the forces to withstand attacks and to remain operational subse­
quent to attack. Not only delivery systems, but support systems such as
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early warning and Col facilities must be Included 1n an assessment. In 
addition, the degree of survivability depends on the nature of the attack —  
whether 1t 1s anterior to a political crisis, anticipated to any extent, or 
1s Initiated without ostensible warning.
As mentioned earlier, the Soviet SS-20 IRBM with Its counterforce ac­
curacy presents the most ominous threat to the West's theater nuclear sys­
tems. The French Mirage IV A force, squandrons of IRBMs, SSBNs 1n port for 
maintenance or refit, and C-I systems must be considered highly vulnerable to 
a Soviet first-strike. Theyeatly Improved accuracy of the SS-20 (CEP of 
250 meters) permits the use of smaller warheads which would minimize colla­
teral damage (1f 1n fact this Is of any consequence In a densely populated 
area such as France or Great Britain). The IRBMs are undoubtedly, the most
vulnerable component and along with the M1r1age IV As "are more targets
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than a deterrent." As Incredible as 1t may seem, th’ • realization has
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been speciously subsumed Into French nuclear strategy as "French commen­
tators now speak of the IRBM force as a lightening rod which, when struck 
by enemy forces, would justify a massive retaliatory attack by France's 
sca-launched missiles. The destruction of the French IRBMs would violate 
the French sanctuary and clearly reveal enemy Intentions of an attack a-
1 7fi
gainst French territory." Such an argument 1s not a sufficient justi­
fication for maintaining the land-based nuclear forces.
The French might rederess the vulnerability of the land-based missile 
system by super-hardening missile silos, by moving to a mobile missile sys­
tem, or by Implementing a "launch-on-warning" strategy. However, each of 
these courses presents tactical difficulties. For Instance, given the dis­
tance between the Soviet and French forces, 1t 1s debatable whether a launch-
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on-warning strategy 1s even possible.
The French SSBN force is clearly the most potent leg of the triad.
French SLBMs now contain 80 percent of the total deliverable megatonnage of
the French strategic forces and this will Increase to over 90 percent by
178
1988 1f present modernization programs remain Intact. Submarines at sea 
represent the most Invulnerable part of the French nuclear deterrent but 
this Invulnerability could gradually diminish through the decade as the 
Soviets make technological advances 1n ASM capabilities. However, numerous 
variables will likely continue to make the submarine platform the most at­
tractive for France and Great Britain. It is believed that "French nuclear 
submarines are considerably noisier than their NATO counterparts, thus facil­
itating their detection and destruction," but with their current moderniza­
tion plans the French are Increasing the operation patrol area of the sub-
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marines with the M-4 missile and are developing less noisy submarines.
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Additionally, antisubmarine warfare is a highly complex mission 
which involves the sophisticated coordination of numerous ASW platforms. 
Moreover, given the potential destructive capability of each SSBN, an 
actual ASW engagement by the Soviets, to be successful, would have to 
almost simultaneously destroy the two or three French SSBNs. One might 
posit this to be a very conceivable mission for the Soviet SSN armada, 
but such a scenario 1n which the Soviets could focus their entire ASW 
capability on the French SSBNs at sea 1s entirely implausible. Hu* French 
and British sea-based deterrents will continue to remain relatively Invul­
nerable because the Soviets have to distribute their ASW capabilities a- 
cross the French, British, American and NATO components of the West's sea- 
based deterrent forces.
One additional factor plays a role 1n the credibility of the French 
nuclear forces as 1t does with the British force. The limited Soviet ABM 
system does not come close to neutralizing U.S. offensive firepower, but 
1t does present difficulties for the French and British deterrent posture. 
The 1972 U.S.-USSR ABM treaty and the 1974 Protocal permit the Soviets a 
deployment of 100 ABM interceptors around Moscow although they only deDloy 
64. Although the system 1s antiquated, "1t still presents a formidable de­
fence against medium-range nuclear powers with their relatively small num- 
ber of re-entry vehicles and unsophisticated penetration aids." Trident 
should remedy this situation for the British but the French will probably 
continue to face this quandary in the 1990s. As Paul Stares pos.,s, "The 
British and trench can only hope that the number of Galosh launchers never 
exceeds 64 and that the logic of ABM constraints remains true. In the final
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analysis the ability of France to penetrate Soviet defenses effectively
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will rest on the careful choice of targeting . . . "
Problems and Trends of the 1980s
Like 1t or not, strategic realities are steering the French to a 
strategic nuclear force configuration based almost exclusively on nuclear 
submarines. This seems an optimal course to follow 1f c,I systems are 
hardened and continuously upgraded. The SSBN appears to be the most prom­
ising platform for the French deterrent given Its Invulnerability at least 
for the near future. Further, the French would be wise to divert all bud­
get allocations set for strategic nuclear modernization to the submarine 
leg of the present triad. Such a concentration of resources would be more 
cost-eff1c1ent and 1t might enable France to partially redress the tech­
nology gap 1n nuclear weapons' development with the superpowers which seems 
to widen year by year. For example, there have been twenty-year lags be­
tween U.S. deployment of MRV and MIRV technologies and prospective French
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deployment of tha same technologies.
Chances are less than si 1m that the French will pursue construction of 
standardized nuclear weapon systems with the U.S. as has Great Britain, even 
though 1t would be beneficial from a military perspective. Domestic politi­
cal realities, lack of complete French participation 1n NATO, and the prob­
lems France observes the British having 1n basing procurement weapon deci­
sions on U.S. decisions, make such a development all but Impossible 1n the
72
near future.
Although French strategists are reluctant to admit 1t, the credi­
bility of the French deterrent 1s, like the deterrent of Great Britain, 
dependent on the American strategic nuclear guarantee.
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Conclusion
The Western powers are each conducting extensive modernization of 
the sea-based components of their strategic nuclear forces. While a 
growing reliance on submarine launching systems carries with 1t numerous 
problems, chiefly with supporting C.I systems and Incremental Improvements 
1n Soviet ASW capabilities, such a reliance appears to be plagued with 
fewer problems than land-based systems. This will become even more ev1- 
dnet as the superpowers begin to deploy their next generation of strategic 
weapons 1n the late 1980s, most of which will possess a counterforce tar­
geting potential. These capabilities will 1n turn make land-based systems 
more vulnerable to surprise attack and further Increase the attractiveness 
of sea-based systems.
Given their limited resource bases, the submarine launch platform 1s 
certainly the most appealing option for France and Great Britain. The small 
er sizes of their strategic forces necessitate that the level of Invulnera­
bility of a strategic system be the most salient consideration 1n choosing 
between procurement alternatives. The United States must also continuously 
secure Its retaliatory options and the sophisticated Trident system should 
credibly accomplish this task well Into the 21st century.
Although Soviet ASW capabilities do pose a possible threat to the sea- 
based deterrents of the Western powers, 1t 1s likely that the advantage will 
remain with the SSBNs during the 1980s and 1990s. Antisubmarine warfare 1s 
an enormously complex activity requiring the Integrated coordination of 
many diverse platforms. Moreover, as mentioned earlier, given the destruc-
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t1ve potential of even one SSBN, a success rate of less than 100 percent 
would have grave consequences.
The deployment of counterforce warheads on the Trident II system 
seems to be a less optimal, 1f not altogether unnecessary, course of action. 
It 1s debatable whether the United States needs a counterforce targeting 
potential 1n Its retaliatory strike-force. The deployment rests on the 
assumption that deterrence would be enhanced 1f the U.S. President were 
given the option of destroying hardened Soviet targets should the Soviets 
launch a less than all-out nuclear attack. This 1s a dubious proposition 
and 1t does not clearly justify the over $8 billion that will be spent on 
research and development of the D5 missile alone. These funds would be 
better expended on incremental Improvements to the evasive techniques and 
overall Invulnerability of the Trident system. Additionally, the D5 missile, 
1n all probability, will not be a stabilizing element to strategic deter­
rence.
Rather than actually deploying the D5 missile, American Interests In 
maintaining strategic deterrence would be more appropriately served by 
using the 05 missile as a bargaining chip 1n a new round of arms control 
negotiations. Given the American advantage over the Soviets In SLBM and 
SSBN technologies, this could prove to be a very effective tactic 1n obtain­
ing curbs on Soviet land-based systems. Furthermore, future negotiations 
should also work to establish constraints on ASM capabilities 1n order to 
continuously ensure the credibility of the retaliatory capacity of each 
side. Here too, the advantage of the United States 1n ASW technologies 
might provide some useful leverage 1n negotiations with the Soviet Union.
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